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Abstract
This Comment addresses the Middle East peace process, focusing upon the relationship be-
tween Israel and Palestine. Part I discusses the background of the land that today comprises the
State of Israel and its territories. This Part summarizes the various accords and peace treaties
signed by Israel, the Palestinians, and the other surrounding Arab Nations. Part II reviews com-
mentary regarding peace in the Middle East by those who believe Israel needs to surrender more
land and by those who feel that Palestine already has received too much. Part II examines the
conflict over the permanent status negotiations, such as the status of the territories. Part III argues
that all the parties need to abide by the conditions and goals set forth in the Oslo Accords before
they can realistically begin the permanent status negotiations. Finally, this Comment concludes
that in order to achieve peace, both sides will need to compromise, with Israel allowing an inde-
pendent Palestinian State and Palestine amending its charter and ending the call for the destruction
of Israel, though the circumstances do not bode well for peace in the Middle East.
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INTRODUCTION
Israel's' history has always been marked by a juxtaposition
between two peoples-the Israelis and the Palestinians 2-each
believing that the land is rightfully theirs according to their reli-
gion' and history.4 In 1897, Theodore Herzl5 wrote DerJeden-
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1. THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK 1782 (39th ed. 1998) (describing Israel as small
country located in Asia). The western border of Israel is compromised of Egypt and
Mediterranean Sea. Id. Lebanon is located directly north of Israel. Id. Syria is to the
northeast and the Dead Sea and Jordanian land comprise the rest of the eastern bor-
der. Id. This region was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516-1917, and then was
under a British mandate from 1923-1948. Id.
2. See LARRY COLLINS & DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, O JERUSALEM! 23 (1972) (stating that
there were 1.2 million Arabs in Palestine at time of partition). But see, e.g., Justus R.
Weiner, The Palestinian Refugees' "Right to Return" and the Peace Process, 20 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 1, 4 (1997) (explaining that "Palestinians" are split into refugees and
displaced persons). The first group is the Palestinian refugees who left the land in
1948. Weiner, supra, at 4. The second group is comprised of the refugees' offspring
and displaced persons, which are people who left in 1967. Id. Both of these numbers
are difficult to tally. Id. at 7.
3. See EUROPA, supra note 1, at 1782 (stating Judaism is officially recognized reli-
gion of Israel); see also WHrrAKER's ALMANAC (131st ed. 1999) (stating 90% of Palestini-
ans are Muslim and other 10% are Christian).
4. SeeJOHN R. HINNELLS, A HANDBOOK OF LIVING RELIGIONS 21, 135 (1984) (stating
that Abraham, as first monotheist, is considered by Jews to be first Jew and by Muslims
to be first Muslim); see also The Koran 17:1 (stating God "made His servant go by night
from the Sacred Temple [Mecca] to the farther Temple [Jerusalem] whose surround-
ings We have blessed. .. "). According to the Old Testament, God said to Abraham:
I will maintain my covenant between Me and you and your offspring to come
as an everlasting covenant through-out the ages, to be God to you and your
offspring to come. I give the land you sojourn in to you and your offspring to
come, all the land of Canaan [the historic name for Israel], as an everlasting
possession.
Genesis 17:7-8. According to the Old Testament, "the Lord Appeared to Abraham and
said, 'Unto your seed will I give this land!"' Genesis 12:7. Abraham had two sons: Ish-
mael, from whom Muslims believe they descended, and Isaac, from whom Jews believe
they descended. See The Koran 14:42, 2:127 (stating that Abraham and Ishmael built
Ka'bah at Mecca for Day of Atonement). Isaac, according to the Old Testament, re-
newed Abraham's covenant with God that Canaan would be the land of Isaac's descend-
ants. Genesis 36:2, 3, 4; Jasmine Jordaan, Proposal of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for the
Israeli-Palestinian Oslo II: A Crucial Step in Establishing Long-Term Economic Stability in Pales-
tine and a Lasting Peace, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 555, 555 (1997) ("[B]oth sides stubbornly
believe that their own religion and history has given them the right to the land"); Jarred
A. Fishman, Are International Institutions Doing Their Job? Middle East Peace Process, 90 AM.
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staat, beginning the Zionist movement6 and planting the idea of
an independent Jewish state.7 Herzl intended that the Jews
build their new homeland in what is today known as the nation
of Israel.8
During World War I, Great Britain declared themselves pro-
ponents of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, as long as the new
state did not impede the rights of the non-Jews who were already
living in the region.9 This declaration was solidified in the Man-
date for Palestine ("Palestinian Mandate")."° When the League
of Nations11 at the end of World War I assigned Palestine to
Great Britain, the pledge of the Jewish homeland was incorpo-
Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 463 (1996) (quoting Hasan Rahman as saying that "Palestine is the
home to two peoples, and we must formulate a modality to share the land as two peo-
ples.").
5. See COLLINS & LAPIERRE, supra note 2, at 21 (explaining Herzl's impetus derived
from witnessing Dreyfus affair). Herzl, a Viennese Jew and reporter, witnessed a mili-
tary ceremony where the French convicted Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer on the
French General Staff, of treason. Id. Dreyfus' innocence was considered common
knowledge. Id. He was convicted again at a retrial because, according to Herzl, of
culturally pervasive anti-Semitism. Id.; see also NAOMI BEN-ASCHER & HAYIM LEAF, THE
JUNIOR JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 143-44 (1973) (witnessing this anti-Semitism drove Herzl
to write DerJedenstaat).
6. See MOSHE LESHEM, ISRAEL ALONE 11 (1989) (explaining that Zionism re-
sponded to European anti-Semitism and sought to "transform Jewish people into a con-
ventional nation"). "Just as Moses led the Jews out of Egypt into the Promised Land, so
would the Zionists lead the Jews out of the indignity and discomfort of their European
bondage into self-determination in a country of their own." Id. at 90.
7. See COLLINS & LAPIERRE, supra note 2, at 21 (noting that Herzl did not formally
launch Zionist movement until two years after writing DerJedenstaat). The first line of
DerJedenstaat is: "[t] he Jews who will it shall have a state of their own." Id. At the time
that Herzl wrote his proposal, "30,000 of Jerusalem's 50,000 inhabitants were already
Jewish." Id. at 22.
8. See id. at 21 (noting, though, that "[a]t no time had Jewish life wholly disap-
peared in the Palestine to which Herzl's followers proposed a return."). Interestingly,
Jews were persecuted in Palestine much more under Jerusalem's Christian rule than
under the Ottoman Turks, who were Muslim. Id.
9. See ENCYCLOPAEDIAJUDACIA 131 (1971) (memorializing Balfour Declaration and
conveying "declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been sub-
mitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet."); see also COLLINS & LAPIERRE, supra note 2, at
23 (noting that reason for offer was "[p]artly out of a sincere sympathy for Zionism,
[and] partly in an effort to rally Jewish support for the Allies in World War I . . .").
10. See U.N. Docs., GAOR, 1st Sess., Plenary Meetings (1946) (entrusting Britain
with control of Palestine)
11. See COLLINS & LAPIERRE, supra note 2, at 23 (stating that League of Nations,
predecessor of U.N., approved mandate for Palestine in July 1922, which recognized
"the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for
reconstructing their national home in that country...").
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rated into the Palestinian Mandate. 12 Subsequent to the atroci-
ties of World War II, the Jewish people demanded that the
United Nations' 3 grant them a homeland.'" The State of Israel
was eventually formed in 1948, even though Palestinians and
Jews battled each other for the land. 5 From 1948 until 1993,
there was unrest between the Jews of Israel and the Palestinians,
who believed the land should be theirs.' 6 These differing beliefs
and goals led to fifty years of conflict and several wars.1 7
Beginning in 1978, Israel and the Arab Nations' 8 slowly be-
gan to open lines of communication.' 9 Since 1993 Israel has
signed agreements, such as Oslo I and Oslo II (collectively "Oslo
Accords"), to get toward the goal of peace. 20 As set forth in
these agreements, final settlement negotiations were supposed
to be completed by May 4, 1999.21 This deadline has passed
without a final agreement between the parties. 22
This Comment addresses the Middle East peace process, fo-
cusing upon the relationship between Israel and Palestine. Part
I discusses the background of the land that today comprises the
State of Israel and its territories. This Part summarizes the vari-
12. See id. (stating that immigration was slow at first, but with rise of Nazi persecu-
tion, many Jews fled to Israel and in 1935-36 immigration reached its peak at 60,000).
13. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 645 (1990) (defining United Nations as
international organization of nations for promoting world peace and security and not-
ing that it was formed in 1948).
14. See COLLINS & LAPIERRE, supra note 2, at 23 (explaining that "[t]he United
Nation's recognition of their right to such a state seemed to the Jews no more than just
reparation for the suffering the world had inflicted on them.").
15. Id. at 14.
16. See Brigadier General Uri Shoham, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military
Government in the Territories, 153 MIL. L. REV. 245, 247 (1996) (describing Israel as sur-
rounded by Arab nations as well as other details of wars).
17. See id. (describing War of 1967 as full scale war in region).
18. For purposes of this Comment, "Arab Nations" refers to the nations surround-
ing Israel including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
19. See Camp David Agreements, Sept. 17, 1978, Egypt-Isr-U.S., 17 I.L.M. 1466
(signing "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East").
20. See, e.g., Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,
Sept. 13, 1993, Isr-P.L.O., 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Oslo I]; Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, With Selected Annexes, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr-P.L.O., 36
I.L.M. 551, 567 [hereinafter Oslo II].
21. Oslo I, supra note 20, art. V, at 1525 (stating that five year transitional period
was to begin upon withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza Strip and Jericho).
22. See Thomas W. Lippman, US. Embassy in Israel to Remain in Tel Aviv; Clinton
Cites Peace Talks, National Security in Decision To Waive Relocation Law, WASH. POST, June
19, 1999, at A14 (noting that not only have permanent settlement negotiations not
been concluded, but they have also not yet started negotiating).
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ous accords and peace treaties signed by Israel, the Palestinians,
and the other surrounding Arab Nations. Part II reviews com-
mentary regarding peace in the Middle East by those who be-
lieve Israel needs to surrender more land and by those who feel
that Palestine already has received too much. Part II examines
the conflict over the permanent status negotiations, such as the
status of the territories. Part III argues that all the parties need
to abide by the conditions and goals set forth in the Oslo Ac-
cords before they can realistically begin the permanent status ne-
gotiations. Finally, this Comment concludes that in order to
achieve peace, both sides will need to compromise, with Israel
allowing an independent Palestinian State and Palestine amend-
ing its charter and ending the call for the destruction of Israel,
though the circumstances do not bode well for peace in the Mid-
dle East.
I. FORMATION OF THE ISRAELI STATE, CONFLICT,
AND THE PEACE ACCORDS
A. History and Formation of the Israeli State
In 1937, Great Britain, then the occupiers of Palestine, rec-
ommended partitioning Palestine into an Arab state, which
would be incorporated into Transjordan,23 and a Jewish state.2 4
Nothing was implemented from the 1937 plan, and in August
1947 the U.N. established a committee that recommended a par-
tition plan to divide Palestine into three territories: an Arab
State, a Jewish State, and a third area that would be under inter-
national control.25 The fighting, however, continued between
the Israelis and the Palestinians through the partition plan and
even after the armistice in 1949.26
23. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1444 (1st ed. 1973) (explaining
that country is currently known as Jordan, or Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan).
24. See Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status of Pal-
estine During the Interim Period, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 37 (1997) (explaining
that Great Britain seemed to intend keeping Palestine as single state, but it agreed to
work toward making Jewish homeland in area described in Balfour Declaration).
25. See id. at 38 (stating that United Nations proclaimed that third area would be
an "internationally administered enclave around Jerusalem"); see also COLLINS & LA-
PIERRE, supra note 2, at 17 ("Most important, the United Nations plan refused to both
states sovereignty over the city ofJerusalem, the pole to which, since antiquity, the polit-
ical, economic and religious life of Palestine had gravitated.").
26. See COLLINS & LAPIERRE, supra note 2, at 48 (stating that "[n]either the Arabs
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1. Pre-Statehood Developments
Great Britain's desire around 1937 was to keep Palestine a
single state.27 Nonetheless, it supported a partition of Palestine
due to the deteriorating relations 28 between the Jews and the
Arabs.29 Palestinian Arabs rejected the plan, and in 1947, Great
Britain relinquished its control over the fate of the land to the
United Nations."° Israel declared an independent state in May
1948 in accordance with the U.N. partition.3 1
2. Original Partition Plans for Palestine and Israel
Under the plan dividing Palestine into three territories,
fifty-seven percent of the land would be given to the Jews to form
an independent state, despite the fact that Palestinian Arabs rep-
resented two-thirds of the population.32 After much hesitation,
the Zionists, representatives of the Jewish people fighting for an
independent state of Israel, agreed to this division of land,33 yet
the Palestinian Arabs refused to agree to it. 4 On May 14, 1948,
the Zionists declared an independent state of Israel on the land
allocated to the Jews in the U.N. Partition Plan.35
nor the Jews were completely unprepared for the struggle which the U.N. vote made
inevitable.").
27. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 37 (noting that Great Britain had already signed
Balfour Declaration promising Jewish State in land of Palestine).
28. See id. (finding that pro-Jewish stance was not well-received by Palestinian
Arabs, leading to violence).
29. See id. at 38 (arguing that Zionists thought land allotted to them was too small
and Arab Palestinians felt Great Britain had no right to partition land).
30. Id.; see also PAUL HARPER, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 19 (1990) (explaining
that terrorist Jews bombed Great Britain's headquarters in Palestine, killing 88 people
including Britons, Arabs, and Jews).
31. See IARER, supra note 30, at 19 (noting that Great Britain refused to imple-
ment partition plan and instead relinquished Mandate on May 15, 1948).
32. See COLLINS & LAPIERRE, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that Arabs owned more
land in what became Jewish state than Jews did).
33. See id. at 18 (explaining that this division of land was not what Jews wanted).
"The proposal had been a staggering blow to Jewish hopes. Re-creating ajewish state in
Palestine without Jerusalem as its capital was an anathema to the Jewish people, the
resurrection of a body without its soul." Id.
34. Id.; see also, BARRY RUBIN, REVOLUTION UNTIL VICrORY? THE POLITICS AND HIS-
TORY OF THE PLO 4 (1994) (noting that Palestinians received little support for their
position, possibly due to the Palestinian leader's support of Nazi's, which increased
support for Jews).
35. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 39 (explaining that although Israel declared state-
hood only over U.N.-allocated land, it had control over some land allotted to Arab
Palestinians as well).
1999] ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE OLSO ACCORDS 235
A civil war between the Arabs and the Jews ensued and by
the time armistice talks began, the Jews had conquered most of
Palestine. 6 Palestinian Arabs enlisted the help of Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, and Syria in trying to block the partition plan and make
Palestine an independent Arab State.37 The 1948 war followed,
ending with the Jews defeating the Arab Nations and taking all
of British occupied Palestine except the West Bank, which Jor-
dan retained, and the Gaza Strip, which Syria retained.38
3. Post 1948 Conflicts Between Israel and the
Surrounding Nations
In 1967, the Arab Nations39 completely surrounded Israel,
and desired to take back the land they felt should never have left
their possession.4 ° In the war that followed, commonly termed
the Six-Day War, Egypt mobilized its armed forces from the
south, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria invaded Israel from
all other angles. 41 There were 3000 U.N. soldiers in the Sinai
region42 where Egypt mobilized its army.a3 These U.N. forces
withdrew after demands by Egypt that they do so."' One com-
mentator states that the leaders of each of the Arab Nations
spoke of the demolition of Israel and the Israeli people, believ-
ing that only one of the two peoples could exist.45 Israel decided
36. See HARPER, supra note 30, at 24 (stating that by time armistice agreements
were concluded in 1949, Israel encompassed almost 80% of territory that was British-
occupied Palestine).
37. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 4 (explaining that Lebanon and Saudi Arabia also
lent help, but that each nation sought to obtain Palestine for itself).
38. See id. (stating that between 630,000 and 730,000 Palestines left Palestine and
450 Palestinian Arab villages had disappeared).
39. See id., at 13 (listing Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, as nations whose armies Israel
defeated).
40. See Shoham, supra note 16, at 247 (stating that certain Arab Nations wanted to
eliminate Israel and thus "rectif[y] what in their eyes was nothing more than a tempo-
rary historical footnote").
41. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 492 (1997) (showing that Syria's
border is comprised of northern borders of both Jordan and Iraq). The western border
of Syria is adjacent to Israel. Id. The southern most part of Israel is in proximity to
Saudi Arabia, with Jordan between the two. Id.
42. See WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1478 (1st ed. 1973) (stating that
Sinai is peninsula between Red Sea and Mediterranean).
43. Shoham, supra note 16, at 247.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 24748 (explaining that President Gamal Abdel Naser of Egypt, Presi-
dent Aref of Iraq, and Chairman of Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") Ah-
med Shukairy, all proclaimed that they wanted to destroy Israel).
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to launch a preemptive air strike that destroyed most of the
Egyptian army's planes while they were still on the ground.4 6
The war lasted only six days, but by the end Israel wrested the
Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egyptian control.47 In
addition Israel seized control of the West Bank48 from Jordan
and the Golan Heights from Syria.49 The acquired territory
comprised the other twenty percent of what was British-occupied
Palestine prior to the 1947 partition plan.5" After the Six-Day
War, Israel offered to return all of the newly acquired land, aside
from the newly unified Jerusalem, in return for full peace with
its neighbors. 51  The Arab Nations rejected this plan, and re-
fused to recognize Israel as a state with whom they would negoti-
ate.5 2
On Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, Egypt and
Syria surprised Israel by attacking on the holiest Jewish day.53
The war lasted for three-weeks, and at the end, Israel pushed the
Arab Nations back to the pre-war lines.54 U.S. and Soviet negoti-
ation led to a cease-fire in order to end the war.55 Commenta-
tors state that the goal of the failed attempt was to restore the
territory lost by Egypt and Syria in 1967.56
46. See id. at 248 (noting that Israel perceived threat to national security and there-
fore launched air strike).
47. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 13 (stating that Gaza Strip was part of pre-1948
Palestine, but Sinai was not); see also THE WORLD ALmANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 492
(1997) (sttaing that Gaza Strip is area on Mediterranean Sea that borders Sinai Penin-
sula).
48. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 13 (explaining that Golan Heights were not part of
pre-1948 Palestine); see also THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcTs 492 (1997) (stat-
ing that West Bank comprises large area in center of Israel bordering Dead Sea and
Jordan).
49. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 13 (stating that "resulting humiliation and hope-
lessness inflamed the Arabs' worst fears that Israel would take over the region.").
50. SeeJohn Quigley, The Oslo Accords: More Than Israel Deserves, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L.
L. & POL'V 285, 286-87 (1997) (explaining that Israel gained control of all land that
comprised British occupied Palestine).
51. See Shoham, supra note 16, at 249 (explaining that Arab nations did not want
peace with Israel, preferring instead to claim all of former British mandate).
'52. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 13 (stating that Arabs held summit in 1967 and
together decided against dealing peacefully with Israel).
53. See id. at 45 (describing attack's effect on Israel).
54. See id. (noting, however, that many Arabs felt regained honor they had lost in
Six-Day War).
55. See HARPER, supra note 30, at 31 (noting that U.S. nuclear forces were on world-
wide alert in case of Soviet intervention).
56. See id. (finding that war was not primarily about Palestinian problem).
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B. The Camp David Agreements
The Camp David Agreements forced Israel and Egypt to rec-
ognize the 1967 U.N. Resolution 242.57 This resolution recog-
nized the need for members of the Middle East to respect and
acknowledge the political independence and sovereignty of the
states in the region and their right to live in peace.5" The Camp
David Agreements also recognized United Nations Security
Council Resolution 3385" ("Resolution 338") .6o Resolution 338
summoned Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the
Palestinian people to negotiate on the settlement of the Palestin-
ian situation." By negotiating with Egypt and agreeing to recog-
nize these two resolutions, Israel recognized that the Palestinian
people had rights. 62
1. Resolution 242
Resolution 242 required the withdrawal of the Israeli armed
forces from the territories they acquired during the Six-Day
war.6 3  The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 242
shortly after the Six-Day War.64 The United Nations stated that
the refugee problem needed to be addressed and that demilita-
rized zones had to be created.65
Following Resolution 242, the U.N. General Assembly rec-
ognized the Palestinians' status as a people, their core role in
achieving a just resolution of the Palestinian's situation, and
57. See Shoham, supra note 16, at 249; Resolution 242, U.N. Security Council Offi-
cial Records, 22nd Year Supp. (1967) [hereinafter Resolution 242] (representing "the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include ...
[w] ithdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.").
58. See id. (recognizing "every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.").
59. Resolution 338, U.N. Security Council Official Records, 28th Year Supp.
(1973) [hereinafter Resolution 338].
60. See Camp David Agreements, supra note 19, at 1467 (trying to reach peace
through treaties "based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts").
61. See id. (using three stages to achieve goal of peace).
62. Id.
63. See Resolution 242, supra note 57, at 8 (requiring "[tiermination of all claims
or states of belligerency").
64. See id. at 9 (adopting resolution of November 22, 1967).
65. See id. (requesting U.N. Secretary General to designate "Special Representa-
tive" to go to Middle East to help achieve peaceful settlement in accordance with Reso-
lution 242.)
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their right to self-determination.66 No real changes occurred in
the Middle East, however, until the 1978 Camp David Agree-
ments.6 7 At Camp David, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin agreed to a framework
of peace in the Middle East that offered some Palestinian auton-
omy in occupied territories, as well as setting the stage for an
agreement between Israel and Egypt.6 8 The Camp David Agree-
ments created a framework for peace that could be used for the
entire Middle East.69
2. Resolution 338
Resolution 338, passed during the Yom Kippur War,70 had
the following requirements: that the fighting cease, Resolution
242 be implemented, and that the Israelis and the Arabs com-
mence negotiations. 71  The negotiations regarding the West
Bank and Gaza Strip were supposed to proceed in three stages
and were very similar to the three stages later implemented in
the Oslo Accords.72 All parties comprehended the symbolic na-
66. See id. at 8 (stating there was necessity "[flor achieving ajust settlement of the
refugee problem"); Dajani, supra note 24, at 41; see also WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1041 (1st ed. 1973) (defining self-determination as "determination by the
people of a territorial unit of their own future political status.").
67. Camp David Agreements, supra note 19. Since the Camp David Agreements,
much talk and negotiation occurred regarding the Middle East Peace Process between
Israel and the Arab Nations, often with the United States as a monitor. See Middle East
Peace Process, (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/regional/nea/summit/
chron.htm> [hereinafter Middle East Peace Process] (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (giving time line of peace process since Camp David).
68. See Middle East Peace Process, supra note 67, at 12 (noting that agreement offers
limited autonomy to Palestinians in occupied territories, setting stage for Israeli-Egyp-
tian peace treaty).
69. See Camp David Agreements, supra note 19, at 1466 (stating that "[t]he agreed
basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United
Nations Security Resolution 242, in all its parts.").
70. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 45 (explaining that Yom Kippur War occurred in
1973-74, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on Jewish Holy Day of Atonement, catch-
ing Israelis by surprise).
71. See Resolution 338, supra note 59, at 10 (calling for cease-fire within 12 hours
of Resolution being adopted and for immediate negotiations between parties).
72. See Camp David Agreements, supra note 19 (breaking down peace process into
three stages: first, transitional arrangements for West Bank and Gaza Strip for period of
no more than five years; second, Egypt, Israel, andJordan agreeing on how to establish
elected self-government authority in West Bank and Gaza Strip; and third, negotiations
to decide final status of West Bank and Gaza Strip, including peace treaty between
Israel and Jordan). Cf Oslo I, supra note 20 (breaking up process into immediate ac-
tions, interim period where power and control over occupied territories switches hands,
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ture of the negotiations and Egypt and Israel realized that they
were witnessing a historic moment.73 The Israelis viewed making
peace with Egypt as a stepping stone to peace in the Middle
East.74 From an Egyptian standpoint, many of the dreams that
were set out in these accords have become a reality.75
Despite numerous obstacles, this co-existence has remained
essentially peaceful for twenty years.76 Initially, problems existed
for both Israel and Egypt with other Arab Nations. 77 For in-
stance, the Palestinians refused to participate in the Camp David
process. 78 In March 1979, certain Arab Nations boycotted Egypt
as a result of the Israeli/Egyptian bilateral peace treaty79 signed
in Washington. ° In accordance with the treaty, Israel returned
Sinai to Egypt, but remained in control of the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank. 1
Eventually, these other Arab Nations also moved towards
peace. 2 In 1986, Jordan's King Hussein severed links with the
Palestinian Liberation Organization8" ("PLO") after PLO leader
and then permanent status negotiations whereby fate of Palestine is negotiated and
determined).
73. See Camp David Agreements, supra note 19, at 1463 (describing President
Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and warm welcome he received as "historic initiative... [that]
created an unprecedented opportunity for peace . . ").
74. See Ian S. Lustick, Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Process Between Political
Partnership and Legality, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 741, 744 (1997) (emphasizing that Israeli
and Egyptian leaders referred to each other as "partners"). Prime Minister Rabin said,
"Ulust as we made peace with our greatest enemy in war, with Egypt, so will we make
peace with others who were our enemies and who will be our partners in building peace
in the Middle East." Id.
75. Alison Inafuku, Regional and Global Impacts of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, 89 AM.
Soc'v INT'L PROC. 363, 363 (1995) (quoting Ambassador Nabil Eleraby, Mission of
Egypt to the U.N., during panel at Syracuse University April 7, 1995, who argued that
Israeli occupation of land acquired in 1967 should come to end).
76. See id. at 379 n.4. (including obstacles, such as lack of other Arab Nations'
support).
77. See Middle East Peace Process, supra note 67, at 11 (including Arab boycott of
Egypt and 1981 assassination of President Sadat).
78. See Weiner, supra note 2, at 6 (pointing out that there was no need to debate
who were deemed Palestinians due to boycott).
79. Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Mar. 26 1979, 18 I.L.M. 362 (1979)
[hereinafter Egypt Peace Agreement].
80. Middle East Peace Process, supra note 67, at 11.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Israel-Jordan: Treaty of Peace, Oct. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 43 (1995)
[hereinafter Jordan Peace Treaty] (establishing peace between Jordan and Israel recog-
nizing each other's sovereignty).
83. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 70 (explaining King Hussein and PLO's troubled
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Yasser Arafat refused to accept U.N. resolutions regarding the
peace talks.8 4 This stance in alliance with the United Nations
occurred eight years before Jordan and Israel met in Washing-
ton to declare an end to their state of conflict.85 Tensions
heightened during 1987-93 when the PLO spurred uprisings
among Palestinians through an Intifada.86 Confronted with the
option of treating the Intifada as a war or attempting to pursue
peace, Israel chose the latter.
8 7
C. The Oslo Accords
The Israelis and the PLO chose to pursue peace,88 with the
breakthrough occurring in Oslo. 9 Oslo I codified the Oslo ne-
gotiations.9 ° Oslo II's purpose was to create a momentum that
would push Israel and the Palestinian Authority toward reaching
a final settlement as well as to create a learning period in which
trust and confidence could grow.9 Oslo I sets out the basis for
past, including 1970 when King Hussein of Jordan imprisoned and expelled PLO of-
ficers and gunmen and banned PLO propaganda; in 1986Jordan again closed its doors
to PLO with King Hussein noting that PLO did not keep their word and attempt to
make peace in Middle East); see also Dajani, supra note 24, at 27 (stating PLO emerged
as international representatives of Palestinian people in 1960s).
84. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 77 (explaining that in November 1985, Arafat
promised to confine future terrorist attacks solely to Israel and occupied territories, and
that PLO Central Council met simultaneously and refused to recognize Resolutions 242
and 338).
85. SeeJordan Peace Treaty, supra note 82 (having Israel withdraw from land held
in Jordan on January 30, 1995).
86. Lustick, supra note 74, at 743. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 85 (explaining that
Intifada, which literally means revolt, was incapable of creating independent Palestinian
state). The Intifada brought the Palestinian issue international attention and sympathy.
RUBIN, supra, at 86.
87. See Lustick, supra note 74, at 743 (stating that military option was deemed too
unilateral, so Israel felt peace was better answer).
88. See, e.g., Shaw D. Dallal, The Palestinian Israeli Peace, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 43, 45 (1996) (stating that Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat shook
hands on Sept. 13, 1993, to mark beginning of Oslo I Agreement).
89. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 60 (noting that this process led Israel and PLO to
recognize each other's sovereign right to exist, and impelled drafting of Oslo I). Oslo I
created the framework for negotiations regarding the final status of occupied territories
and established that the Palestinian self-governing authority should lead during the
interim period. Id.
90. Oslo I, supra note 20.
91. SeeJustus R. Weiner, The Hebron Protocol. The End of the Beginning or the Beginning
of the End of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 373, 416 (1997) ("With
the DOP breakthrough in 1993, hopes blossomed that an era of trust could, within the
modest period of less than six years, write a new page of history and result in an endur-
ing permanent status agreement resolving all dimensions of this conflict.").
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Oslo 11.92 Oslo II, however, supercedes all but Oslo 1.93 The par-
ties wanted to move Israel and Palestine toward permanent sta-
tus negotiations through Oslo 11. 4 Oslo II specifies that the per-
manent status negotiations are to commence as soon as possible,
but no later than May 4, 1999."5
1. Declaration of Principles ("Oslo I")
Secret meetings between the Israeli government and the
PLO occurred over the course of 1993 in Oslo.96 Up until the
Oslo negotiations, both the Israelis and the United States re-
fused to recognize the Palestinians' right to participate in the
Middle East peace process. 97 They also refused to recognize the
PLO as the representative of the Palestinians.98 Making this rec-
ognition was a crucial first step toward peace.9 9 Scholars note
that the scope of the rights recognized by Israel, however, is diffi-
cult to assess.10 0
When Oslo I was signed, PLO leader Yasser Arafat shook the
hand of Prime Minister Rabin on the White House Lawn."0 ' The
leaders agreed to a three stage plan toward peace.10 2 The first
92. Oslo I, supra note 20.
93. See Weiner, supra note 2, at 4 (formulating Oslo II as final interim agreement
superceding all other previous agreements).
94. See Oslo II, supra note 20, at 558 (stating that one aim of Oslo II is election of
Council for five year interim period beginning May 4, 1994 and "leading to a perma-
nent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338").
95. See id. (stating that permanent status negotiations would start no later than
May 4, 1999).
96. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 60 (noting that there were at least 14 rounds of
negotiations). Johann Jorgen Holst, former foreign minister of Norway, mediated
these talks. Id.
97. See id. at 41-42 (arguing that United States and Israel still refrain from acknowl-
edging Palestinians' claimed right to self-determination).
98. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 89 (stating that PLO is known terrorist organiza-
tion that has claimed credit for taking lives of many Israelis). Syria arrested several
thousand of Arafat's supporters in Syria and killed many others in Lebanon. Id.
99. See Jordaan, supra note 4, at 555 (recognizing Israel's desire to participate in
peace negotiations).
100. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 44 (pointing to failure of Israel and PLO's agree-
ment to mention self-determination of Palestinians).
101. See Dallal, supra note 88, at 45 (noting that handshake was historic and that
only days before, letters were exchanged between leaders allowing for Oslo I). To
many, the handshake was to "mark the end of a violent history and the beginning of an
era committing Palestinians and Israelis to share a country each claims as exclusively its
own." Id.
102. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1529 (stating that there will be an interim agree-
ment and permanent status negotiations, as well as Oslo I).
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phase involved the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza
Strip and Jericho. 10 3 The second stage implemented an Interim
Agreement ("Oslo II") 104 that redeployed Israeli forces in the
West Bank and transferred certain agreed powers.' The final
phase envisioned the creation of a Permanent Status Agreement
finalized by the end of the Interim Period, May 4, 1999.106 Many
commentators believe that what made the agreement at Oslo
possible was the adoption of a gradual approach whereby issues
were sorted into those requiring immediate attention and those
warranting postponement until the final status negotiations. 107
Yet, the parties have neither agreed upon the present status of
Palestinians, nor the status that the Palestinians will have after
the final status negotiations-leaving the debate for later negoti-
ations."0 "
Oslo I specifies that the aim of the negotiation is to create
an interim Palestinian Authority ("PA").1°9 The PA is elected to
serve for a transitional period that should lead to permanent set-
tlement resolutions based on Resolutions 242 and 338.11' Oslo I
103. See id. (noting that "[u]pon the entry into force of this Declaration of Princi-
ples and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, a transfer of authority
from the Israeli military government .. . to authorised Palestinians . ..will com-
mence.").
104. Oslo II, supra note 20.
105. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1530 (stating that "[t]he Interim Agreement shall
specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members,
and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and
its Civil Administration to the Council.").
106. Id.; see also Shoham, supra note 16, at 269 (summarizing agreement and not-
ing that first two stages of implementation proceeded smoothly).
107. See Inafuku, supra note 75, at 364 (noting that important features of Oslo I
"are conceived in this two-phase plan").
108. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 28 (noting that when Prime Minister Netanyahu
took office, he declared that he was opposed to formation of independent Palestinian
State).
109. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1525 (stating that aim was "[tJo establish a 5-year
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority."); see also Dajani, supra, note 24, at 72
(observing that there are many differences between PLO and Palestinian Authority
("PA")). The PA has municipal authority over affairs of Palestinians in Occupied Terri-
tories. Dajani, supra. The PLO has broader decisions regarding Palestinian people liv-
ing outside Occupied Territories and ultimate status of Palestine, but they do not have
legal authority over decisions of PA that relate to local governance of Palestinians in
Occupied Territories. Id. The PA and PLO, however, are intrinsically intertwined. Id.
The PLO negotiated for the creation of PA and Arafat is the leader of both. Id.
110. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1527 (stating aim of negotiations is to establish
elected Palestinian Council "for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading
to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.").
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also specifies the need for a general election in Palestine under
democratic principles and agreed upon supervision."' Once
elected, the PA will preside over designated areas in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip.112 Israel and Palestine specifically ta-
bled difficult issues until the permanent status negotiations, in-
cluding the status ofJerusalem, refugees, settlements, security ar-
rangement, and borders? 13
During this interim period, Oslo I dictated that Israel is to
transfer power to the PA." 4 Oslo I provided for immediate Pal-
estinian authority over education, health, social welfare, direct
taxation, and tourism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." 5 Oslo I
set out the framework for Oslo II, discussed the composition of
the PA, and dictated that once the PA is elected, Israel will with-
draw its military presence from the occupied areas.1 1 6 Israel was
to redeploy the military forces outside of the populated areas." 7
The redeployment was to occur gradually and there was a special
schedule for the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho ar-
eas.' 1 8 After its withdrawal, Israel would remain responsible for
the external security of those territories as well as the internal
security of the Israelis living in those areas." 9 Additionally, Oslo
I states that the roads are to remain open for both Israeli and
111. See id. at 1528 (noting that "[i]n order that the Palestinian people in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct
free and general political elections will be held for the Council under... international
observation").
112. See id. (stating that "U]urisdiction will cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip
territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotia-
tion.").
113. See id. at 1529 (explaining that "[it is understood that these [permanent sta-
tus] negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settle-
ments, security arrangements, borders.... .").
114. See id. (stating that authorized land will be transferred only after inauguration
of PA).
115. See id. (providing for Palestinian control immediately after Oslo I enters into
force and Israel withdraws from Gaza Strip and Jericho).
116. See id. at 1532-33 (explaining that "[a]fter the entry into force of this Declara-
tion of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeploy-
ment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place. ).
117. Id. at 1533.
118. See id. (noting that Palestinian Police will assume responsibility for "public
order and internal security").
119. See id. at 1544 (stating that "subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will
continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public
order of settlements and Israelis.").
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Palestinian use.
1 20
To ensure a smooth transition, the parties established a
Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee 121 to deal with dis-
putes and issues that require coordination. 122 Oslo I called for
future negotiation on outstanding issues after an interim period
during which the PA would have certain power and autonomy
over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 123  Oslo I established a
framework for negotiations to reach a final status agreement. 124
Accordingly, many agreements have been subsequently signed in
the Middle East.
125
2. Interim Agreement ("Oslo II")
Article I of Oslo II sets out the basic terms for the transfer of
authority from Israel to the Palestinians as well as defining the
powers that Israel retains under this agreement. 26 The West
Bank is the first area where the Israeli military government will
turn over power to the PA.' 27 Pursuant to the Oslo Accords,
state status is an issue to be taken up in the permanent status
negotiations.128
a. Transfer of Authority
The transfer of authority from Israel to Palestians is enu-
merated in Article I of Oslo 11.129 Oslo II expands Oslo I and
enumerates how elections will occur, 13 who is allowed to vote, 13 1
120. See id. (stating that roads within Gaza Strip and Jericho are included).
121. See id. (noting that committee will be equally represented by each side).
122. See id. at 1531-32, 1544 (noting that parties can add technicians and experts if
necessary).
123. See Quigley, supra note 50, at 285 (finding that agreement has "the prospect
of bringing resolution to the long-standing territorial dispute over Palestine").
124. But see id. (offering that agreements provide Palestinians less than they are
entitled and, therefore, that the agreements unfairly favor Israel).
125. See Middle East Peace Process, supra note 67 (listing accomplishments in post-
Camp David agreements).
126. See Oslo II, supra note 20, at 558-59 (noting that powers will be transferred to
Council or to PA until such time that Council is elected); but seeJordaan, supra note 4,
at 593 (noting that Oslo II has vague and very generalized language).
127. Id. art. XI, at 561.
128. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1528 (leaving issue to be debated).
129. See Oslo II, supra note 20, at 558-59 (noting that transfers will occur gradu-
ally).
130. Id. art. II at 559 (stating that PA members will serve throughout Interim pe-
riod); see also, Dajani, supra note 24, at 62 (noting PA/Council members' terms will end
at conclusion of Interim Period).
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and the structure of the Palestinian National Council ("Coun-
cil")-or until the point that it is established, the structure of the
Palestinian Authority.1 2 The Council will have legislative and
executive power in accordance with Oslo I, but cannot adopt any
laws inconsistent with Oslo II. 1' Oslo II also dictates that an
independent judicial system composed of independent Palestin-
ian courts and tribunals will be convened.1
3 4
b. The West Bank and Gaza Strip
The redeployment of Israeli military forces is set out in
phases, with the first phase commencing in the populated areas
of the West Bank.' 35 The West Bank is split into three areas.
1 6
Area A includes the larger cities of Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin,
Jericho, Kalkilya, Nablus, Ramallah, and Tulkarm. 3 v Area B
consists of smaller towns and villages where the PA has control
over civilian life, but Israel is in control of internal security.'3 8
The Israeli-controlled remainder of the West Bank, including ru-
ral areas, military zones, and Israeli settlements, is designated as
Area C.' 39 The land located in Areas A and B come under the
Council's jurisdiction in the first phase. 4 ° Under Oslo II, Israel
must transfer only authority over the people in Area C during
the first phase, and not transfer authority over the land in that
area. 4' The Council must assume responsibility for both the in-
131. See Oslo II, supra note 20, art. II, at 559 (including Palestinian individuals in
West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem).
132. See id. art. III at 559 (calling for immediate election of speaker). The Coun-
cil, once it is inaugurated, will replace the PA and assume all of the responsibilities of
the PA under various Agreements. Id. art. XXXI, at 567.
133. See id. art. III, at 559 (stating that "[i]mmediately upon its inauguration, the
Council will elect from among its members a Speaker.").
134. See id. art. IX, at 561 ("[t]he Palestinian Council may adopt all necessary
measures in order to enforce the law and any of its decisions, and bring proceedings
before the Palestinian courts and tribunals.").
135. See id. art. XI, at 561 (including "cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and
hamlets").
136. Id.; see Keith C. Molkner, Legal and Structural Hurdles to Achieving Political Sta-
bility and Economic Development in the Palestinian Territories, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1419,
1429 n.32 (1996) (describing towns and villages within West Bank).
137. Molkner, supra note 136.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Oslo II, supra note 20, art. XI, at 562.
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ternal security and public order in Area A.'4 2 In Area B Israeli
military forces will be completely redeployed, which means that
the Palestinian Police will have control over public order,143 but
Israel will retain responsibility for protecting Jews in the area
and confronting terrorism.144
There are several Jewish Holy Sites in Area A14' and the Pal-
estinian Police are in charge of protecting these sites and the
people who visit them.146 Ajoint Mobile Unit ('jMU") will con-
sist of vehicles from both the Israelis and Palestinians.1 47 The
JMU's job is to respond to emergency situations 148 and will be
situated in the area surrounding the holy sites and on access
routes to these sites. 149  Oslo II permits Israeli plain clothed
guards within the sites to monitor them as well. 5 ° Also, while
the PA will govern in the city of Bethlehem, special security ar-
rangements will be made regarding Rachel's Tomb, anotherJew-
ish holy site. 15 1
The redeployment will be effectuated in various stages.' 5 2
Oslo II sets the deadline for withdrawal from the West Bank to
be completed at least twenty-two days before the eve of the
Council's elections. 53 Security arrangements, such as the Israeli
military redeployment, are neither to disturb the Palestinian de-
velopment projects in the West Bank, nor are they to prejudice
the moral or physical dignity of those Palestinians residing in the
142. Id. art. XIII, at 562.
143. See id. art. XIII-XIV, at 562-63 ("The Council shall establish a strong police
force.").
144. Id. art XIII, at 562.
145. Id. at 574, 629 (including Elazer's Tomb and Joshua's Tomb, Samaria, Jewish
Cemetery in Sammerat, and Synagogue in Gaza City).
146. Id. at 574.
147. See id. at 572 (explaining thatJoint Patrol will have one four-wheel drive vehi-
cle from each party and whichever party is supposed to be in control of specific road
will lead other vehicle).
148. See id. (stating thatJoint Mobile Unit ("JMU") "is to provide rapid response in
the event of incidents and emergency situations, in order to ensure free, unimpeded
and secure movement along their designated routes of activity, or in their areas of activ-
ity.").
149. Id. at 574, 619.
150. See id. (explaining that extra measure will be taken because of religious na-
ture of these sites).
151. See id. at 576 ("While the Tomb, as well as the main road leading from Jerusa-
lem to the Tomb... will be under the security responsibility of Israel, the free move-
ment of Palestinians on the main road will continue.").
152. Id. at 569.
153. See id. (noting that this is first stage).
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West Bank."' In the ten day transition period set to occur prior
to each redeployment, the Israeli military will brief the Palestin-
ian Police commanders about the respective area and any spe-
cific problems that the Israeli Military has encountered in the
area. 155 Further redeployments of Israeli military forces are to
take place, according to Oslo I, in three stages.156 During the
period of redeployment, Israel and the Palestinians will negoti-
ate the specific areas to which the Israeli military will be
redeployed.' 57
Israel is still responsible for defense against external
threats.' 58 Oslo II does provide, however, that the Palestinians
can have a police force of up to 30,000 people. 59 The Palestin-
ian Police are the only Palestinian security authority, and no
weapons other than those of the Palestinian Police and the Is-
raeli military are allowed into the occupied territories. 60  The
Council can issue gun permits, however, to private citizens, but
any illegal arms will be confiscated by the Israeli Military.' 6 ' If
individuals are suspected of perpetrating acts of violence, then
the Palestinian Police should arrest and prosecute them.' 6 2
According to Oslo II, both sides are to work together in or-
der to keep the peace.' 63 Regular as well as special meetings will
occur between the commander of the Israeli military forces and
the Palestinian Police in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 1 64 In
154. See id. ("In order to maintain the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit... both sides shall implement the provisions of
this Annex, while respecting... normal and smooth movement of people, vehicles, and
goods within the West Bank, and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.").
155. Id.
156. See id. (detailing stages are each to be six months apart, completion to be not
more than 18 months after inauguration of Council).
157. See id. (noting that this will be part of permanent status negotiations as well).
158. See id. at 562 (including Egyptian and Jordanian borders)
159. See id. at 573 (stating that of these police officers, up to 12,000 may be
deployed in West Bank and up to 18,000 in Gaza Strip). These police forces will be
deployed in phases similar to Israeli deployment of their military. Id. The total
number of Palestinian recruits from abroad cannot exceed 5000 in West Bank and 7000
in Gaza Strip, but these recruits can bring their children and spouses. Id.
160. See id. at 563, 569, 573 (including enumeration of weapons that police are
allowed to have-i.e., up to 4000 rifles and up to 120 machine guns of 0.3" or 0.5"
caliber).
161. Id. at 569.
162. See id. at 569 ("The Palestinian Police will act systematically against all expres-
sions of violence and terror.").
163. Id. at 570.
164. See id. (occurring as appropriate).
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order to help facilitate this coordination, each side must operate
a twenty-four hour regional security coordination office with di-
rect and constant communication between both sides.1 65
Terrorism is another area where the two parties agreed to
cooperate. 66 The parties agreed to exchange information and
to coordinate policies and activities.1 67 Whether it be Israeli or
Palestinian terrorists, both sides agreed to take all measures to
end the violence.1 61 In order to implement this goal, the parties
agreed to apprehend, investigate, and prosecute persons sus-
pected of terrorism.' 69
Oslo II also addressed some confidence building meas-
ures. 170 Israel agreed to turn over Palestinian detainees and pris-
oners in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the PA. 17' The
released persons are free to return to their homes in the territo-
ries.1 72 The two parties agreed to help each other with searching
for missing persons and bodies of persons that have not been
recovered. 73 Also, Palestinians from abroad who under Oslo II
can enter the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will not be prose-
cuted for offenses committed before September 13, 1993.'71
The Oslo Accords addressed the need for the Palestinian
Charter to be amended. 75 As per the chairman of the PLO's
letter to the Prime Minister of Israel, the PLO agreed that within
two months of the inauguration of the Council, it would make
changes in the Palestinian Covenant. 176  Also, they agreed to
165. See id. (having up to six officers from each side: one commander and five
duty officers).
166. See id. at 571 ("Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the
occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and
shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence.").
167. Id.
168. See id. (agreeing to "actively prevent incitement to violence, including vio-
lence against the other side or persons under the authority of the other side").
169. See id. (preventing, also, damage to infrastructure serving other side such as
roads, water, electricity, telecommunications, and sewage).
170. See id. at 563 (attempting "to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good
faith").
171. See id. (occurring, as with most everything else in Agreements, in stages).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 567.
174. See id. at 563-64 (agreeing that Israeli officials will not harass released Pales-
tinians).
175. See id. at 568 (stating Council "will convene and formally approve the neces-
sary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant").
176. Id.
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abide by the standards of international law.17 7 Both sides agreed
not to incite the other by any means, such as propaganda, and
that each side's education system will contribute to peace be-
tween the two parties.
1 78
c. Declaration of a Palestinian State
Under the Oslo Accords, Israel reserves conferring state sta-
tus on the territories, instead making that part of the final nego-
tiation process. 179 Oslo II restates the idea that the Council will
not have power in the international arena, although certain ex-
ceptions are carved out.18  Commentators note that the reason
for not allowing the Council to engage in international processes
is to prevent influencing Palestine's status before the final settle-
ment negotiations.'
3. Post Oslo II Developments
In May 1994, an agreement regarding the West Bank and
Jericho area was signed in Cairo.'82 This agreement provided
for the partial withdrawal of the Israeli administration and
troops in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, and transferred most of the
local control to the PA.' 8 1 Israel and the PLO also entered the
Agreement on the Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities
177. See id. at 565 (agreeing to use "internationally-accepted norms and principles
of human rights and rule of law.")
178. See id. at 566 (undertaking to have mutual understanding and tolerance).
179. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1528 (finding state status to be difficult issue and,
therefore, to be negotiated in final status negotiations); see a/soJordaan, supra note 4, at
590 (emphasizing that result of territories lacking capacity to enter into relations with
other states is found under Restatement (Third) of Foreign Law of United States);
Shoham, supra note 16, at 272 (explaining that general status of territories remains
same during Interim Period, even though partial authority is granted to Palestinians).
Some commentators have argued that Oslo II demonstrates Israel's unwillingness to
diminish its control over Palestine. Jordaan, supra.
180. See Oslo II, supra note 20, at 561 (including specific economic agreements,
agreements with donor countries in interest of regional development plans or aiding
PA, as well as cultural, scientific, and educational agreements).
181. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 68 (finding that if PA were allowed to participate
in international politics, then other countries might treat PA as independent state,
thereby weakening Israel's position in final settlement negotiations).
182. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-P.L.O.,
33 I.L.M. 622 (signed in Cairo, Egypt) [hereinafter Cairo Agreement].
183. Id.
249
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("Erez Agreement").184 This agreement allowed for the limited
transfer of authority to Palestine to parts of the West Bank
outside Jericho area.a85 The Erez Agreement specifies that the
PA will have no power over Jerusalem, settlements, military loca-
tions, or Israelis. 186
In October 1994, Israel andJordan signed a peace treaty. 87
In the peace treaty, Israel andJordan recognize each other's ter-
ritory, and, once the treaty became effective, agreed to keep to
their own side of the international border.188 The two parties
also agreed to deal with the refugee and displaced persons issue
on a bilateral level.189 The Hebron Protocol' 90 was signed in May
1997, which intended to wrap up loose ends in Oslo II as well as
to clear the table to begin the permanent status talks.' The
Hebron Protocol set up a Temporary International Presence in
Hebron for a three month period in order to create a feeling of
security for the Palestinians living in Hebron.1 2 Finally, the Wye
River Memorandum19" was signed in order to help both parties
continue to fulfill their obligations under previous treaties and
to move the peace process forward.' 94 According to the Wye
River Memorandum, both sides affirm their fight against terror-
184. Agreement on the Prepatory Powers and Responsibilities, August 29, 1994,
Isr.-P.L.O., 34 I.L.M. 455 (signed at Erez, Israel) [hereinafter Erez Agreement].
185. See id. art. II, at 458 ("Israel shall transfer and Palestinian Authority shall as-
sume powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Ad-
ministration in the West Bank in the following spheres: education and culture, health,
social welfare, tourism, direct taxation . . .").
186. See id. art. III, at 458 (excluding those items Oslo I postponed until final set-
tlement negotiations).
187. Jordan Peace Treaty, supra note 82.
188. See id. art. III, at 47 (noting, however, that boundary set out is permanent
"without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military gov-
ernment control in 1967.").
189. See id. art. VIII, at 49 ("Recognizing that the above human problems [i.e.
refugee and displaced persons] caused by the conflict in the Middle East cannot be
fully resolved on the bilateral level, the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate
forums, in accordance with international law...").
190. Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron
("TIPH") and Memorandum of Understanding between Denmark, Italy, Norway, Swe-
den, Switzerland and Turkey on the Establishment of the TIPH, January 1997, Isr.-
P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 547 (signed atJerusalem) [hereinafter Hebron Protocol].
191. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 425 (noting that Israeli Cabinet voted 11-7 to
endorse Hebron Protocol, which was quite narrow margin).
192. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 190, at 549 (including "up to 180 members
from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey").
193. The Wye River Memorandum, October 23, 1998, Isr.-P.L.O. 37 I.L.M. 1251.
194. See id. at 1251 (claiming that agreement was signed so that "the Israeli and
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ism.195 This agreement restates that May 4, 1999 is the deadline
for the completion of the permanent status negotiations and re-
iterates the goal of all of the accords: peace in the Middle
East.196
II. FACTORS AFFECTING COMPLIANCE WITH OSLO I AND
OSLO II COMPETING VIEWS
Scholars note that in order for the peace process to con-
tinue moving forward, the Oslo Accords must be deemed en-
forceable by the international community and recognized as in-
ternationally valid.'97 Also, the Oslo Accords have been violated
by both sides.' 98 It seems clear from both parties that until the
violations of the Oslo Accords stop, especially with regard to ter-
rorism, Israel and Palestine will not come close to peace.' 99 In-
tentionally, the parties left what they deemed the hardest issues
for last.200
A. Enforceability of the Oslo Accords
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 20' ("Vienna
Convention") proclaimed that treaties are enforceable only if
Palestinian sides can more effectively carry out their reciprocal responsibilities, includ-
ing those relating to further redeployments and security respectively.")
195. See id. at 1252 ("Both sides recognize that it is in their vital interests to combat
terrorism and fight violence ...").
196. See id. at 1255 (noting that United States offered to facilitate permanent status
negotiations).
197. Louis Rene Beres, Why the Oslo Accords Should be Abrogated By Israel, 12 AM. U.J.
INT'L L. & POL'y. 267 (1997); Quigley, supra note 50; See Jordaan, supra note 4, at 591
(noting if Oslo Accords are not believed to be enforceable, then either party could
renege at any time and claim they were never under obligation).
198. See, e.g., An Oslo Scorecard, Middle East Digest, (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http:/
/www.cdn-friends-icej.ca/medigest/sept98/scorecard.html> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal) (including Israel not withdrawing from certain territories on
time and Palestinians working with Hamas).
199. See Netanyahu: Peace Process in 'Virtual Collapse', THE JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 31,
1997, (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/31.Mar.1997/
News/Article-0.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that
Arafat's support of terrorism is significantly stalling peace process); see also Arafat's Di-
lemma, ECONOMIST (UK), Mar. 2, 1996, at 40 (saying that Israel must stop terrorism
against Hamas).
200. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1528 (including status of territories, Jerusalem,
and refugees and displaced persons).
201. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 1. 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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they are codified between states. 202 By the terms of the Oslo Ac-
cords, Israel did not confer state status on Palestine,2 °3 leaving
open the question of whether the Oslo Accords are binding. 20 4
Some scholars state that since Palestinians fear they may have
not entered into a binding agreement, they have heightened
feelings of distrust, insecurity, and believe that they are at Israel's
mercy, with minimal autonomy. 20 5 Israel negotiated, however,
with the PLO on behalf of all Palestinians in Oslo I and Oslo II,
and not just with the Palestinians living in the occupied territo-
ries. 2 0 6
Aside from the issue of Palestine not being a state, the PLO
is considered by many scholars to be a terrorist organization, 20 7
and therefore these scholars believe that the PLO should not be
permitted to negotiate with Israel. 208 In order to ensure the de-
202. Id.; see also Jordaan, supra note 4, at 590 (assuming, therefore, that under
Vienna Convention, Oslo II is not fully enforceable by Palestine); see also Beres, supra
note 197, at 271 (objecting that PLO, which is non-state, is held to same standard of
accountability as Israel under international law); seeJordaan, supra note 4, at 590 (not-
ing that Israel and Palestine do not have equal recognition by international legal stan-
dards).
203. Oslo I, supra note 20; Oslo II, supra note 20; Dajani, supra note 24, at 79.
("Although the PLO and the PA each fulfill aspects of the objective criteria for state-
hood at least as well as some recognized States, the two bodies do not, together, form a
unit independent and unified enough to constitute a state.").
204. See Beres, supra note 197, at 271 (stating two parties should not be held to
same standards of accountability because of their unequal obligations). In response,
another scholar states that since both entities are "subjects of international law" and
both intend to be bound, Oslo I is a binding agreement; see also Quigley, supra note 50,
at 288 (responding to Beres).
205. SeeJordaan, supra note 4, at 591 (claiming that Israel's delays and threats to
change Oslo II have lead investors to be wary, which frustrates Palestinian people and
their cause). Scholars also claim that it is essential for Israel to guarantee that any
contract entered into between foreign investors and Israel will be honored by Israel. Id.
at 594.
206. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 69 (noting that Oslo Accords are not unilateral
enactments by State of Israel, but instead are international agreements).
207. Louis Rene Beres, Israel After Fifty: The Oslo Agreements, International Law, and
National Survival, 14 CONN. J. INT'L 27 (1999) (stating that PLO is known terrorist or-
ganization); see also RUBIN, supra note 34, at 150 (according to 1986 poll of West Bank
Palestinians, who are most moderate segment of Palestinians, around "88 percent justi-
fied seizing an Israeli bus and murdering a teenaged passenger; about 21 percent en-
dorsed placing bombs on civilian airliners (60 percent if the target was an El Al plane),
and nearly 37 percent backed the machine-gunning of travelers in the Vienna and
Rome airports.").
208. See Beres, supra note 197, at 271 (specifically objecting to clause releasing
PLO members); accord Inafuku, supra note 75, at 367 (stating that despite fact that
terrorism attacks all states and, therefore, is universal problem, still believe that peace
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feat of terrorism, some scholars maintain that an agreement is
needed whereby all states agree to either extradite or prosecute
terrorists. 20 9 One expert states that it is a violation of Principle I
of the Nuremberg Principles to form any agreements with a ter-
rorist organization calling for the release of terrorists. 210 It must
be noted, however, that the United States and the Russian Feder-
ation witnessed Oslo 1211 and the United States, the Russian Fed-
eration, Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the European Union all wit-
nessed Oslo 11.212
B. Violations of the Oslo Accords
There have been many violations of the Oslo Accords by
both the Israelis and the Palestinians. 213 The Palestinian Char-
ter, which calls for Jihad214 and thereby the destruction of the
Jews, was to be amended. 215 Also, article XXII of Oslo II calls for
abstention of incitement, including use of propaganda,216 yet
process should move forward). But see Weiner, supra note 91, at 403 ("In the name of
the Oslo peace process, Yasser Arafat and his PLO cronies were given a blanket amnesty
for decades of terrorism and thousands of murders.").
209. See Inafuku, supra note 75, at 367 (quoting Ambassador Robbie Sabel finding
that terrorism is "phenomenon that requires regional cooperation .. . [o]ur aim as
lawyers must be to provide the legal framework whereby such individuals have no safe
haven"); see also, Beres, supra note 197 (stating that no government has right to lawfully
pardon or grant immunity to terrorists who have violated international law).
210. Beres, supra note 197, at 269; see Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An
Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REC. 833, 833 (1990) (stating that Nuremberg repre-
sents first real attempt to merge international law with fundamental moral principles
and "gave notice to the nations of the world that, henceforth, claims of absolute sover-
eignty must yield to the world community's claim on peace."); see also Louis Rene Beres,
After the "Peace Process:" Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 301,
301 (1997) (stating opponents of Oslo Accords also believe that creation of Palestinian
State from territories is expected to reduce tension in Middle East, but more likely
outcome is encouragement of war and terrorism).
211. Olso I, supra note 20, at 1544.
212. Oslo II, supra note 20, at 568.
213. See e.g., Oslo Scorecard, supra note 198, (giving "scorecard of both the Pales-
tinian and Israeli violations").
214. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 617 (1st ed. 1979) (definingJihad
as "a holy war waged on the behalf of Islam as a religious duty").
215. See Louis Rene Beres, The Oslo Agreements in International Law, Natural Law,
and World Politics, 14 Aiuz. J. Itr'L & COMP. L. 715, 734 (1997) (quoting Palestinian
Charter as saying ". . . [t]here is no solution to the Palestinian problem except byjihad
... I will assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill."); see also Oslo II, supra note
20, at 569 (providing for making necessary changes to Palestinian Charter).
216. See Oslo II, supra note 20, art. XXII, at 566 (providing "Israel and the Council
shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and... shall take legal meas-
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both sides feel that the other is guilty of using propaganda to
incite their populace. 7 Terrorism, however, seems to be the
violation that is stalling the peace process the most.218  Upon
close analysis, it appears that the Oslo Accords have been imple-
mented in some instances, while stalling in others.2 9
1. Palestinian Violations
The PLO's charter rejects a peaceful solution to the situa-
tion, and calls for the destruction of Israel.22 0 An amendment to
the Palestinian Charter was one of the preconditions for Israel
recognizing the PLO.22 1 On September 9, 1993, Yasser Arafat
wrote a letter to Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin affirming that the
clauses calling for the destruction of the Jews no longer exist,
but the Council, at that time, still needed to vote on the change
to make it official. 22
Scholars note that Arafat's reluctance to challenge the op-
position to changing the charter can be interpreted as his fear of
a Palestinian civil war.2 23 Many radical Palestinians prefer a holy
ures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups, or individuals within
their jurisdiction.").
217. See Israeli Implementation of Obligations Contained in the Israeli-Palestinian
Agreements (visited Jan. 30, 1999) <http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/policy/pp-
10html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating Palestinian side
distributed documents listing supposed Israeli violations of Oslo Accords); see also Oslo
Scorecard, supra note 198 (explaining Palestinian objection to Israel's use of biblical
names for West Bank and Gaza Strip).
218. See, e.g., Chronology of Bombing Attacks Following September 1993 Accord
(visited Feb. 16. 1999) <http://www3.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/top/022596/top-
story_12128_S8.html > (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (listing at-
tacks of Palestinian militants in Israel post-Oslo Accords).
219. See Oslo Scorecard, supra note 198 (stating Israel left West Bank, but later
than called for in agreement); see also Letter Transmitting the National Council's Reso-
lution to Amend the Palestinian National Charter Fulfilling the PLO Obligations, 36
I.L.M. 771 (1997) (amending Charter, but three years late).
220. See Molkner, supra note 136, at 1424 (demonstrating Palestinian leaders' con-
flicting political pressure: jihad or peace).
221. See Oslo II, supra note 20, at 568 (undertaking to change Charter)
222. See Israel-PLO Recognition (visited March 10. 1999) <http://www.mfa.gov>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) ("those articles of the Palestinian
Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist.., are now inoperative and no longer valid.
Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Charter for
formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant."). In a
subsequent letter dated the same day, Rabin wrote that due to the PLO commitments of
Arafat's letter, Israel would recognize the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian
people. Id.
223. See James Bruce, The PLO, Israel and Security-Part 2: The Peace Process Under
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war to regain territory rather than peace. 24 As long as the Char-
ter remained unchanged, commentators stated that the security
measures taken by the Israeli government were justified.225
In April 1996, the PLO and the Council decided to amend
the Charter. 2 6 The Israeli government was not satisfied with the
amendments. 227 In December 1998, the Central Council of the
PLO, who are the core members of the Council, ratified the
amendments to the PLO Charter. 228 A week later, all of the
present Council members accepted the content of Arafat's letter
to U.S. President William Clinton.229 The letter detailed twenty-
six articles that had been renounced. 2 0 Numerous members of
the Palestinian Council boycotted the meeting though, leading
commentators to believe they did not want to move forward
Attack, 8JANE's INTELLIGENCE REV. 220 (1996) (claiming that until Arafat can prove that
'Palestinians are masters of their own destiny" there is strong chance of opposition
from within which makes him vulnerable to Israeli pressure on security).
224. Jordaan, supra note 4, at 565. Shoham, supra note 16, at 246. This is not to
say that are no Israeli radicals who are against the peace process. Shoham, supra. In
Israel there is an extreme right that wants to annex the territories, an extreme left that
wants an immediate state of Palestine, and the majority of the population who realize
that control of the territories is currently necessary. Id. See Dallal, supra note 88, at 44
(linking assassination to outcry of Jewish settlers in response to Oslo I and Oslo II).
Also, a Jewish extremist assassinated Rabin. Dallal, supra.
225. SeeJordaan, supra note 4, at 565 (finding that PA is actually doing Palestinians
disservice by refusing to amend Charter).
226. See Letter Transmitting the National Council's Resolution, supra note 219, at
772 ("[T]he Palestinian National Charter is hereby amended by cancelling the provi-
sions that are contrary to the letters exchanged between the PLO and the government
of Israel on 9/10 Sept. 1993.")
227. See Morton A. Klein, PLO's Vote Didn't Change the Covenant, JEwISH POST OF
NEW YORK (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.jewishpost.com/jp0205/jpn0205a.htp>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that it "used future tense
and was unspecific").
228. See Joel Greenberg, Council Backs Revoking Call To Destroy Israel, THE PATRIOT
LEDGER, Dec. 11, 1998, at 5 (reporting that by this action, PLO Central Council was
'setting the stage for a broader meeting with President Clinton" to affirm that articles
calling for Israel's destruction have been amended). This action was done in prepara-
tion for President Clinton's visit to the region in order to prove that the Charter had
indeed been amended in accord with the Wye River Memorandum. Id.
229. See Palestine/Charter-3: No Count Taken, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 14,
1998 (noting Israel said in response they would not pull back troops that week as re-
quired under Wye, but instead would wait for Arafat to publicly withdraw from plans to
declare independent Palestinian state in May of 1999 and would wait for them to crush
the riots in the West Bank).
230. See Barbara Demick, Many Palestinians Unwilling To Quit Struggle with Israel,
SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at A16 (explaining there are only 33 articles total in
charter).
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peacefully with Israel.
231
Some scholars claim that the use of hostile propaganda has
not ended, and thus constitutes a violation of Oslo 11.232 Com-
mentators further posit that Palestinians use their children in
the propaganda war against Israel. 233 Also, Israel is not included
on the map of the Middle East on the Palestine web site. 234 This
maneuver conflicts with Palestine's stated goal to recognize
Israel's statehood, as part of the compliance measures detailed
in the Oslo Accords.235 Instead, the entire land of Israel is la-
beled Palestine.236 When described in the geography page, Pal-
estine is described as encompassing Israel and the occupied ter-
237ritories.
Since the Oslo Accords were signed, terrorism, especially su-
icide bombers, has increased greatly.23 Arafat allows Hamas to
231. See id. ("unwilling to give up an armed struggle against Israel" and accusing
Arafat of padding attendance with his own loyalists).
232. See Oslo II, supra note 20, art. XXII (preventing use of propaganda by either
side); see also Senior Palestinian Officials Continue to Incite Against Israel in Violations of Oslo,
Israeli Government Press Office, May 29, 1997, (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://
www.isrinfo.demon.co.uk/articl24.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal) (quoting statement made on PA's Voice of Palestine by cabinet in Nablus on May
16, 1997). Palestinian propaganda has included the following radio announcement:
We did not pay with the dear blood of thousands of martyrs so that the Israeli
government could establish settlements on our land in the name of peace. We
have sacrificed in the past and we will be ready to sacrifice again in the future
for the sake of liberating our land and returning it to the bosom of the Pales-
tinian nation and for the sake of establishing an independent Palestinian state
whose capital is Jerusalem.
Id.
233. See Oslo Scorecard, supra note 198 (arguing that this is contrary to fostering
atmosphere of peace and tolerance as was undertaken at Oslo).
234. Map of Palestine (visited February 16, 1999) <http://www.palestine-net.com/
geography/gifs/palmap.gif> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); see gen-
erally Beres, supra note 197, at 279 ("Indeed, even Israel's 'friends' in the Middle East,
i.e., Egypt and Jordan .. . do not include Israel on any of their maps.").
235. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1527 (recognizing Resolutions 242 and 338 that
call for respect and recognition of all of states in Middle East area).
236. Id.
237. See Palestine: Geography (visited Feb.16, 1999) <http://www.palestine-
net.com/geography/> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (defining
Palestine as "currently under occupation ... located on the East Coast of the Mediterra-
nean Seas, West of Jordan and to the South of Lebanon. The territory of Palestine
covers around 10,435 square miles..."). This description is of the land of Israel and the
Occupied Territories according to the Accords and other nations' maps. Id.
238. See id. (explaining that many terrorist attacks consist of Palestinian suicide
bombers, such as one who blew up bus in Jerusalem killing four Israelis, one American,
and wounding over 100 people on Aug. 21, 1995); see also Death Toll Since Oslo Is 50%
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set up base in the Gaza Strip, which appears to contradict any
efforts to stop terrorism.23 9 Also in violation of Oslo II, Arafat
invited Hamas to join the PA.24 ° In March 1997, Netanyahu said
that the PA's approval of terrorism against Israel had hurt the
peace process to an extent that brought it to a virtual collapse.2 4 '
Due to the rise of terrorism, Israel conditioned the continuation
of the peace process on Arafat's commitment to ending terror-
ism. 24 2 In March 1996, Arafat condemned terrorist bombings
and arrested 150 people linked to Hamas' military wing.243 It
has also been reported that there have been hundreds of sus-
pected terrorists arrested in the Gaza Strip.24 4
Israel has had trouble trying to transfer Palestinian
criminals back into Israel to be tried for their crimes.245 Arafat's
reluctance to address terrorism and to transfer requested ter-
rorists to Israel can be linked to his fear of starting a civil war
with Hamas246 or other Palestinian terrorist organizations.
247
For example in February 1999, a suspected member of Hamas,
Greater than During the Intifada, The Prime Minister's Office, (visited Jan. 30, 1999)
<http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/policy/oslo5.html> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (claiming that total of 279 men women and children have been
killed in 92 attacks by Palestinian terrorists since Oslo Accords).
239. See Beres, supra note 197, at 273 (advocating abrogation of accords since con-
ditions have changed and Arafat is not living up to expectation).
240. Arafat Invitation to Hamas to Join PA Cabinet Without Renouncing Terrorism Vio-
lates Accords (visited Dec. 26, 1998) <http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/policy/violations-
140698.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); see also Oslo II, supra
note 20, at 563 (whereby both sides agree to take all necessary measures to prevent
hostile acts).
241. See Netanyahu: Peace Process in 'Virtual Collapse', supra note 199 (stating that
Netanyahu charged that Palestinian Police encouraged demonstrations occurring ear-
lier in month).
242. See Michael Yudelman, Inner Cabinet Demands PA Crack Down on Terror (visited
March 18, 1999) <http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/24.Mar.1997/News/Article-
1.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (noting first pullback from
West Bank, which was supposed to have started early in March 1997, was neither carried
out nor was safe-passage opened between Gaza Strip and West Bank because Arafat did
not fulfill his commitments to Israel). Most Israeli government ministers took a moder-
ate stance, and agreed to continue talks with the PA. Id.
243. See Arafat's Dilemma, supra note 199, at 40 (stating Arafat ordered all Palestini-
ans living in Palestine-ruled territory to turn in unlicensed weapons).
244. See id. (explaining arrests have caused Palestinian, international, and even
Israeli human-rights organizations to protest).
245. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 389 (finding that from outset of peace process,
PA has refused to enforce or implement provisions requiring criminal terrorists who
commit crimes against Israel to be extradited).
246. See RuBIN, supra note 34, at 165-66 (noting Hamas is militant terrorist organi-
zation and threat to both Israel and Palestinian Authority); see, e.g., Sol Schindler, This
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who also served in the Palestinian Security Force, was sentenced
to death by the PA for killing a Palestinian police officer.24 8 The
passing down of this sentence led to riots in the Gaza Strip,
where Palestinians threw stones at the Palestinian police who re-
taliated with their guns and clubs, as well as tear gas. 249
2. Israeli Violations
Alternatively, the PA claims that Israel also violated the Oslo
Accords by utilizing propaganda techniques. 50 Scholars explain
that Palestine objects to Israel's use of the terms Judea and Sa-
mara even though both sides make use of the term West Bank in
the Oslo Accords.251 Also, talks have stalled over differences be-
tween the parties about security, and Israel has not therefore
reached an agreement about safe passage between the West
Bank and Gaza Strip or an airport in the Gaza Strip.252
In September 1996, protests over Israeli construction of a
tunnel in Jerusalem turned violent and Israeli soldiers killed two
Palestinians. 253  Several months before, a Hamas bombmaker
was killed by an Israeli booby trap.25 4 Hamas responded to the
is Not the Time to Re-establish Relations with Iran, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at B2 (claim-
ing that Iran subsidizes Hamas).
247. See Fishman, supra note 4, at 466 (citing Yoram Dorstein, President of Tel Aviv
University, who says that in order for peace process to proceed, Arafat must face terror-
ism head on instead of trying to avoid it). This criticism has also been levied against
Arafat concerning his reluctance to change the Palestinian Charter. Id.; see Jordaan,
supra note 4, at 565 (discussing changing of Palestinian Charter).
248. See, e.g., Joel Greenberg, 2 Teen-Agers Killed at Protest of Gaza Verdict, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1999, at A4 (explaining that two other militants were incarcerated).
249. See Bloody Riots Continue in Gaza over Militant's Death Sentence: Senate Opposes
Unilateral Palestinian State as Hamas Warns Arafat Against an Execution, STAR-LEDGER, Mar.
12, 1999, at 9 (relaying that riots injured 85 people in fist two days, including 70 police-
men and 15 protesters). The PA claimed that Israeli soldiers caused one of the deaths,
but Israel denied any involvement. Id.
250. See Israeli Implementation of Obligations Contained in the Israeli-Palestinian
Agreements, supra note 217 (defending these accusations as "part of a concerted at-
tempt to try to bring international pressure to bear on one side of the current negotia-
tions and to avoid dealing with the practical resolution of the outstanding issues.., of
the current peace process.").
251. See id. (responding to document "Israeli violations of the Palestinian-Israeli
Agreements" yet noting that Agreement does not prohibit use of these terms).
252. Oslo Scorecard, supra note 198.
253. See Protests over Jerusalem Tunnel Rage Across Palestinian Areas, AGENCE FRANcE-
PRESSE SEPr. 25, 1996, (noting over 300 people were wounded as well).
254. See Arafat's Dilemma, supra note 199 (stating that bombmaker, Yehya Ayyash,
was Israel's main target).
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Israeli booby trap by claiming that they would refuse to stop the
bloodshed until Israel stops their terrorism and releases Hamas
prisoners.255 Israelis fear that terrorists who attack within Israel
escape punishment by fleeing to the territories governed by the
PA.256  The lists of the violations continue with many of the
agreements not being upheld. 57 One of the reasons experts
posit for Palestinians violating the Oslo Accords more often than
Israelis is the notion that Israel is getting the better end of the
deal.25 a
C. Operability of the Oslo Accords
The issues that Israel and Palestine thought would be the
most difficult to resolve were put off until the permanent status
negotiations.259 The issues that were easier to agree upon were
made part of either Oslo I of Oslo 11.26" These more difficult
issues include the debate over the status of the territories, the
Palestinian refugee/displaced person issue, and the West Bank,
Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. 261 The Palestinian leaders and
officials are in the position of not knowing what will be the final
255. See id. (exclaiming that when Israel "stops terrorism against Hamas and re-
leases our prisoners ... we will reach an historic position ... not to shed blood in
Palestine."). Ghazi Hamad, a senior Hamas official, said "[t]he majority of Hamas
members are now ready to give up ... temporarily... the armed struggle against Israel
and turn to political activity." Id.
256. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 389 (noting PA has refused from outset to trans-
fer people suspected of terrorism). According to both the Cairo Agreement and Oslo
II, Israel has exclusive jurisdiction when terrorists attack Israel. Oslo II, supra note 20 at
637; Cairo Agreement, supra note 182, at 693. No person however, is allowed to be
transferred if the offense could carry a capital punishment sentence, unless the request-
ing side asserts that capital punishment will be waived in the case. Oslo II, supra.
257. See Beres, supra note 197, at 515-16 (including PA having too many police,
failure to extradite or punish terrorists, detainment of Israeli citizens, and failure to
confiscate arms and disarm militia).
258. See Quigley, supra note 50, at 297 (stating that even if Israel were to concede
maximum that Palestinians want, including all of Jerusalem, status quo prior to 1948
still would not be restored). Quigley noted that "[f] or Israel, the Oslo agreements do
not represent a bad bargain." Id. This theory is not fully accurate considering that
Palestine was never an independent state. Id.
259. Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1528; Dajani, supra note 24, at 68. As pointed out
earlier, the language of the agreements, as well as leaving the more difficult issues open
until the end, has caused scholars to wonder whether the two parties have agreed from
what or to what they are making a transition. Id. See Inafuku, supra note 75, at 365
(printing Ambassador Elaraby's speech that says "there is not enough clarity about what
course should be attained in the following phase").
260. Oslo I, supra note 20; Oslo II, supra note 20.
261. Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1528.
260 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:230
status of the territories.262 Also the debate about how many peo-
ple can be considered either a displaced person or a refugee and
who will be allowed to return is identified as an issue having a
large role in the permanent settlement negotiations.263 Many
scholars consider Israel as belligerent occupiers of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, which could effect the permanent status
negotiations as well. 26 4 One of the most potentially controversial
debates will occur over East Jerusalem, due to the many holy
sites located there.265 Finally, the question of an independent
Palestinian State and where it will be located, needs to be ad-
dressed in the permanent status negotiations. 66
1. Transfer of Authority
In this state of uncertainty, the Palestinians are responsible
for the administration of the territories under their jurisdic-
tion. 2 " Further, there is the additonal problem that no truly au-
thoritative sovereign exists to whom the territories can be re-
turned.268 When Israel acquired the territories during the Six-
Day War, it immediately tried to give them back to the nations
from whom it had won from, in return for peace.2 69 When this
262. See Molkner, supra note 136, at 1428 (giving examples of independent state or
one which is confederation with Jordan).
263. Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1528; Weiner, supra note 2, at 7-8. "Conflicts over the
precise definition of "refugee" and "displaced person," and the extent to which these
Palestinians or their descendants and relatives by marriage have retained or acquired
their refugee or displaced person status are crucial to the negotiation on the Palestin-
ian return issue." Id.
264. See Quigley, supra note 50, at 289-90 (claiming that Israel has not claimed
sovereignty in West Bank); see alsoJohn Quigley, Living in Legal Limbo: Israel's Settlers in
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 10 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 11 (1998) (stating that West Bank
and Gaza Strip fall under belligerent occupation which occurs whenever foreign army
occupies territory, regardless of whether they were acting aggressively or defensively).
265. See Inafuku, supra note 75, at 369 (discussing that all three major religions
have interest in Jerusalem, but it has had Jewish majority for over 100 years).
266. See Dallal, supra note 88, at 50 (finding creation of independent Palestinian
State inevitable).
267. See Oslo II, supra note 20, at 558-59 (discussing that PA will be in charge of
government in territories).
268. See Beres, supra note 210, at 326-27 ("As a legal entity, Palestine ceased to
exist in 1948, when Great Britain relinquished its League of Nations mandate. Prior to
that decisive moment in history, which was followed by Israel's declaration of indepen-
dence on May 14, 1948, Palestine had never existed as an independent sovereign
state.").
269. See Shoham, supra note 16, at 249 (noting that accepting land would have
meant negotiating with Israel, and Arab nations refused to negotiate with Israel).
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offer was rejected by the Arab Nations, Israel adopted a mixed
approach to governing the territories.270 As more time passed,
however, Israeli authorities were forced to delve into additional
civil spheres in the territories.
271
One scholar has suggested that since statehood will not be
conferred on the territories until the permanent settlement ne-
gotiations conclude, pending these negotiations the territories
are, at least to some extent, under Israeli control.272 Therefore,
these early negotiations legalize the settlements.2 73  Either way,
Resolution 242, which Israel and the PA agreed to accept in the
Declaration of Principles,274 calls for an end of the occupation of
these territories.275
2. Refugee and Displaced Person Issue
The Palestinians base their struggle for national indepen-
dence on the legal foundation of self-determination. 276 Com-
mentators note that self-determination only becomes a legal
right, however, when it is invoked by groups who are recognized
as a people and it is used with regard to a territory that can serve
as its own unit.277 Palestinians argue that they meet these crite-
ria since the United Nations has recognized the Palestinians to
be a people and declared that they have the rights to self-deter-
mination.2 78
270. See id. at 250 (noting that Israel was instructed to abide by Hague Regulations
as well as other various international conventions applicable to occupied territory).
Shoham also explained that "Israel would not acknowledge de jure that the Territories
are occupied territory, thereby effectively setting aside the political aspect of the ques-
tion, but it would govern the Territories de facto under the provisions of customary
international law applicable to belligerent occupation."
271. See id. at 253 (explaining that existing legislature in place in Territory was
lacking).
272. See Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1529 (leaving difficult issues, such as state status,
to final settlement negotiations).
273. See Quigley, supra note 265, at 11 (noting that agreements appear to consti-
tute acknowledgement by PLO that Israel is legally maintaining settlements).
274. Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1527.
275. Resolution 242, supra note 57.
276. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 29-30 (arguing that self-determination has been
elevated to right since "both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights state that 'all peoples' have
a right to self-determination.").
277. Id. at 32-33.
278. See e.g., Resolution 242, supra note 57 (referring to concept of self-determina-
tion). Though the term self-determination is not used, the Resolution calls for "guaran-
teeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area
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One scholar has suggested that in 1922, when Transjordan
was established as an independent principality, it was to be a Pal-
estinian Arab state. 279 Therefore, whatever legal rights the Pales-
tinians have to self-determination have already been fulfilled.280
Whether Israel has recognized the Palestinian's right to self-de-
termination or not, there is some recognition to the Palestin-
ian's claim to land, as seen through the transfer of power in cer-
tain territories to Palestine.28'
There are different classifications of Palestinians that may
affect their right to return to a newly formed Palestinian State.2 8 2
Refugees are generally considered to be the people who left or
were forced to leave their homes in what is now Israel during the
fighting that occurred in 1948.285 Displaced persons are those
who left Israel after the Six-Day War.284
Some commentators contend that due to their direct mili-
tary action, Israel forced out the Palestinians.285 Jordan, who an-
nexed the West Bank,2 86 offered Jordanian citizenship to the
.. ." Id. The Resolution never uses the word Palestine or Palestinian. Id.; see also In-
afuku, supra note 75, at 364 (quoting speech of Ambassador Eleraby stating that Pales-
tinians need to exercise all of their "inalienable rights including the right to self-deter-
mination.").
279. SeeJuLIus STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 22-25 (1981) (stating that designation
of "Palestine referred historically to the territory on both sides of the Jordan River.").
280. Dajani, supra note 24, at 35 n.45.
281. See Lustick, supra note 74, at 742 (explaining that Jewish people emphasize
inevitable sacrifice of Jewish control and sovereignty over parts of Israel and that Pales-
tinians emphasize right of return and humiliating weakness and dependence that will
probably be part of new Palestinian State).
282. See, e.g., Weiner supra note 2, at 8 n.7 (separating refugees and displaced
persons).
283. See id. at 5 (noting that these people pose "thorniest" part of peace process
since, when their spouses and offspring are included, there may be millions of individu-
als). The number of people who actually left in 1948 is strongly debated, ranging from
around 604,000 to 900,000. Id. at 7.
284. See id. (noting there is debate not only on number of displaced persons, but
also on number of old displaced persons-those who left their residences for second
time-and new displaced persons-those who only left once). Presumably, counting
old displaced persons would be unfair since it would count the same person twice. Id.
The disparity between the numbers of these people, including refugees, has widened
over the decades. Id.
285. See John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 171, 172 (1998) (finding that "analysis of the wartime displacement issue is compli-
cated by the fact that the two parties disagree not only over the law but also over the
facts...").
286. See Quigley, supra note 264, at 20 (noting Jordan renounced claim of West
Bank in favor of Palestine).
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Palestinians. 287 The Israelis, conversely, claim that they neither
directly nor indirectly forced the Palestinians to leave.28 8
Israel also claims that it is probably inequitable to require
them, as the country of origin, to bear the entire burden of reha-
bilitating these refugees when the surrounding Arab Nations
would not grant citizenship. 89 Despite its fears,29 ° Israel has let
100,000 displaced persons/refugees back through "family
reunification" as of 1997.291 Almost one million Palestinians
have been granted full Israeli citizenship. 92
3. West Bank and the Gaza Strip
The United States deems Israel as an occupying power in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and therefore subject to the
Hague Regulations. 93 Israel rejects the idea of the territories as
being occupied.294 Some commentators believe that Israel wants
to control the lives and movements, as well as the ultimate
287. See RUBIN, supra note 34, at 9 (offering that this was done to give alternative
loyalty).
288. See Quigley, supra note 285, at 172 (explaining that Israel claims that Pales-
tinians left on their own accord).
289. See Quigley, supra note 264, at 44 (stating that refugees could have been ab-
sorbed into countries to which they fled but were not because those countries favored
formation of independent state to absorb refugees instead). It has been posited that a
large percentage of Palestinian refugees must be absorbed permanently into either the
countries of their current residence, or in the other neighboring countries in the Mid-
dle East. Id.; see also Inafuku, supra note 75, at 370 (quoting Donna E. Arzt as also
saying that result could be acceptable to Palestinians so long as they are compensated
for their abandoned property and given dual citizenship).
290. See Beres, supra note 210, at 302 (noting that areas to which these refugees
return act as buffer zone for Israel from surrounding Arab Nations).
291. Shaai Cahana, The Claim of a "Right to Return"for Palestinians and Its Meaning
for Israel 13 (1993) (pamphlet published by Leonard Davis Institute of International
Relations, Hebrew University, Jerusalem) (Hebrew original).
292. See Louis Rene Beres, Response to John Quigley, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
509, 510 (1997) (stating that this statistic is current through 1997).
293. RIcHARD SCHIFrER, U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL, DEPARTMENT OF STATE: COUNTRY RE-
PORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrICES FOR 1985 76 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 Report];
Shoham, supra note 16.
294. See Beres, supra note 210, at 330 (noting that their right to reject idea of
territories as occupied stems from right to security).
Because transformation of these lands into an Arab state of Palestine would
threaten the very existence of the Third Temple, Israel is under no obligation
to transfer the West Bank and Gaza to another sovereign authority especially
as the extant Arab states, together with Iran, persistently call for 'elimination'
or 'liquidation' of the 'Zionist entity'.
Id. at 330.
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destiny, of the Palestinians, even though it may have relin-
quished some control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.295
Some critics note that Israel has had problems trying to
maintain the territories and therefore Israel is not necessarily in
a weaker position for relinquishing control of the territories.296
Others state that it may be more practical for Israel to relinquish
sovereignty gradually and in proportion to Palestinian compli-
ance with Oslo 11.297 Shortly after being elected prime minister,
Binyamin Netanyahu said that he would seek reciprocity, and a
fulfillment of all of the commitments.
298
The implementation of Oslo II began with the Gaza Agree-
ment being applied within weeks of its signing.29 9 This gave the
Council control of most of the Gaza Strip.300 Also, due to the
redeployment set out in Oslo II, approximately ninety-five per-
cent of Palestinian residents of the West Bank are under the ju-
risdiction of the Council.3 "1
One of the debates is whether Israeli settlements can be
built in the occupied territories.0 2 Under the Geneva Civilians
Convention, 0 3 occupying powers cannot transfer their own civil-
ians onto the land that they are occupying.30 4 Since the 1993
295. See Dallal, supra note 88, at 53 (claiming that this feeling perpetuates tension
between Israelis and Palestinians).
296. See Quigley, supra note 50, at 296 (finding that giving up control of territories
"does not take Israel from an obviously stronger to an obviously weaker position" and
positing that peace with Palestinians is only way that Israel can maintain decent rela-
tions in long term, not only with its neighbors, but with world at large).
297. But seeJordaan, supra note 4, at 559 (arguing that dispute settlement is also
viable alternative to helping peace process).
298. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 432 n. 78 (quoting interview with David Makovsky
in JERUSALEM POST, June 28, 1996, at 7).
299. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 182.
300. See Shoham, supra note 16, at 270 (effectively leaving Israel in control of only
minute portions of area, including 100-meter wide security strip along Egyptian border
and several Israeli settlements).
301. Id. However, Israel's Area C, where Israel retains control, comprises 70% of
the territory of the West Bank. Id. at 273 n.48.
302. See Quigley, supra note 264, at 12 (stating that international community be-
lieves Israel to be in violation of international standards for its settlement construction
activity).
303. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Civilians Conven-
tion].
304. Id.; See Quigley, supra note 264, at 12 (stating that occupying power must
leave land to population that it finds there). The United Nations is expected to pass a
resolution calling for another Geneva Convention on "illegal" activities by Israel in the
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negotiations and the signing of Oslo I, there has been settlement
construction in the territories. °5 Disputes over the building of
new settlements have stalled the peace process.306
Certain factors make it difficult to imagine the West Bank
and Gaza Strip as forming the state of Palestine in the final set-
tlement negotiations.0t After the 1948 war and prior to Pales-
tinian self-rule, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip each func-
tioned as distinct civil administrations .3 0  The two areas are not
in close proximity to one another 30 9 and it is often difficult for
Palestinians, including public officials, to get permission to cross
through Israel to get to the other territory.3 10 Finally, the legal
system of the Gaza Strip derives from English common law
whereas the legal system of the West Bank derives from civil
law.311
One contention is that under the laws of belligerent occupa-
tion, Israel is permitted to protect the security of its temporary
hold on the land and the Israeli settlements serve this pur-
pose. 2 In line with this reasoning, the city of Hebron, in cen-
tral Israel, has also caused much controversy.3" Palestinians
territories that Palestine will occupy. Id.; see also Marilyn Henry, UN Votes on Geneva
Convention over settlements, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 10, 1999, at 2. (quoting Switzerland as
saying that "resolution may send an important political message, but was not a legally
binding decision.")
305. See Quigley, supra note 264, at 7 (stating that since 1993 "settlement-housing
construction has focused on sectors of West Bank adjacent to EastJerusalem and in East
Jerusalem itself.") The goal of this construction seems to be to preempt any future
effort to challenge Israel sovereignty in East Jerusalem. Id.
306. See David Makovsky & Michal Yudelman, PM: Accelerate Final Status Pledges Pal-
estinian Won't Lose Pullbacks if Talks Fail, JERUSALEM POST, March 20, 1997, at 1 (stating
that talks were supposed to resume between parties around March 20, 1997, but did not
"due to Palestinian anger over Har-Homa" in southwestern Jerusalem).
307. See Molkner, supra note 136, at 1428 (discussing court systems and difficulties
they cause).
308. See id. at 1428. (noting that court systems remain separate and distinct with
each governed by its own rules and procedures).
309. Relatively speaking, since the West Bank and Gaza Strip are on opposite sides
of Israel they can be deemed far apart, but it must be noted that Israel in its entirety is
about the size of Vermont.
310. Molkner, supra note 136, at 1428; see Oslo I, supra note 20, at 1537 (providing
for safe passage between Gaza Strip and Jericho).
311. See Molkner, supra note 136, at 1429 (making two legal systems incompatible
and "internally disharmonious").
312. Quigley, supra note 264, at 15 (citing Esther Cohen, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967-1982 (1985)).
313. See, e.g., Jay Bushinsky & Margot Dudkevitch, PM: Peace Process Is in Danger,
JERUSALEM PosT, July 6, 1997, at 1 (stating that "[t]he peace process is in serious danger
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comprise the majority of the population in Hebron. 14 There
are approximately 500Jews that live in downtown Hebron as well
as major religious sites,315 and due to concerns for their safety,
Hebron was the last city to be turned over to the PA.3 16 Under
Oslo II, Hebron was to be split into two sections: one in which
Palestine would have partial jurisdiction, and one in which Israel
would remain in control.3 7 In 1998, there was a decrease in the
number of riots by settlers in Hebron. 18 Most Arab and Jewish
residents agree, however, that the Hebron Protocol" 9 has failed
and there is still tension and strife in the region.32 °
Reporters note that the Jewish community in Hebron was
disappointed in March 1997 when they learned that building
permits and expansion plans would not be approved in the near
future.32' The debate over who can build where has increased
tensions in Hebron. 22 The mayor of Hebron has stated that
conditions have improved for the Palestinians living under Pales-
tinian control, but has worsened for those living in the areas
because of ongoing violence in Hebron . according to Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu.")
314. Weiner, supra note 91, at 377.
315. See Zalmon Shoval, In Hebron, a Brewing Crisis, WASH. TIMES, July 10, 1997, at
A15 ("The late David Ben-Gurion said after the Six-Day War that Hebron, the cradle of
the Jewish faith and nationhood, was just as holy as Jerusalem and that it should be
settled by tens of thousands of Jews.").
316. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 377-78 (noting that there were many violent
encounters between Jews and Arabs in Hebron post 1967).
317. Oslo II, supra note 20, at art. VII (noting there was six month window after
agreement was signed for redeployment to occur); see also Dajani, supra note 24, at 64
(claiming that Netanyahu has expressed dissatisfaction with this agreement).
318. See Margot Dudkevitch, PA Violations in Territories Down, but More Serious. Judea
and Samaria Police Preparing for Declaration of Statehood, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 2, 1999, at 4
(noting that number of riots by settlers in other areas increased by 15% in 1998).
319. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 190.
320. See Margot Dudkevitch & Mohammed Najib, Hebron Agreement One Year Later:
Disappointment and Tension on Both Sides, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 15, 1998, at 2 (claiming
that 54 families living in Hebron's Jewish Quarter feel that safety has declined and that
high gates, to keep stones from hitting their homes, makes it feel like ghetto).
321. See Margot Dudkevitch, No New Building Permits for Hebron's Jews, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 17, 1997 (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/
17.Feb.1997/News/Article-l.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
(stating Israeli Defense Secretary needs to approve all building plans in settlements).
322. See id. (stating settlers and Arabs threw eggs and oranges at each other be-
cause Arabs built market that Jews thought was on their land). The Jews in Hebron
want to expand their settlement and claim that their living quarters are like a ghetto.
Id.
1999] ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE OLSO ACCORDS 267
under Israeli control.12' Netanyahu's policy adviser agreed that,
disappointingly, the Hebron Protocol has not brought about the
desired result of peace in the region.324
4. East Jerusalem
When discussing Jerusalem, 325 the Palestinian claim to self-
determination is an attempt to assert sovereignty over an admin-
istrative unit, EastJerusalem, which, prior to Jordan's invasion in
1948, had no independent existence.326 Israel declared West Je-
rusalem its capital in 1948 and in 1967 it declared the undivided
Jerusalem its capital.3 27 Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority for
at least the past 100 years.3 28 The importance of Jerusalem lies
mainly in its holy sites.3 29 For Jews there is the Western Wall of
the Holy Temple, 3 for Muslims the Dome of the Rock,331 and
323. See Dudkevitch, supra note 321 (noting that Shuheida Street, which under
Agreement was supposed to be open to Palestinian traffic, still remains closed to Pales-
tinians). Many settlers feel that opening Shuheida Street will bring terrorists to their
doorsteps. Id.
324. See id. ("[I]t did not bring about progress in the peace process, mainly be-
cause the Palestinians failed to perceive it as a first step to greater understanding be-
tween Israel and the Palestinian people."). Palestinians expected further withdrawals
despite their lack of compliance with the Oslo Accords. Id.
325. See BEN-AsCHER & LEAF, supra note 5, at 172-73 (explaining Jerusalem is di-
vided into New City, which Israel acquired in 1947, and Old City or East Jerusalem,
which Israel took from Jordan in 1967).
326. See Charles Bryon Baron, The International Legal Status of Jerusalem, 8 TOURO
INT'L L. REv. 1, 4 (1998) (discussing that Turks were in control ofJerusalem from 1517
to 1917 when British took control of Jerusalem, and that neither viewed it as east and
west Jerusalem, but as unified).
327. Id. see Dallal, supra note 88, at 50 n.58(quoting BAsic LAw: JERUSALEM, CAPI-
TAL OF ISRAEL IN 34 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISAEL 209 (1980)) (noting Israeli Kinnesset
in 1980 declared 'Jerusalem, complete and united... the capital of Israel."). This is a
sore issue between the parties since the "Israeli argument essentially amounts to the
establishment of a new principle of international law, namely, the acquisition of terri-
tory by lawful force, coupled with a more compelling argument based on pure self-
determination for the people of Jerusalem, of which the Jews have long compromised
the majority." Dallal, supra, at 32. It however, easily can be concluded that between
1948 and 1967,Jordan was a belligerent occupier of East Jerusalem. Id. at 16, 78 n.58.
Soon after the Six-Day War, Israel attempted to annex East Jerusalem with Law and
Administration Ordinance No. 11 in 21 Laws of the State of Israel 75 (1967).
328. Accord Inafuku, supra note 75, at 369 with Baron, supra note 327, at 32 (both
concurring on point).
329. CoLLINs & LAPIERRE, supra note 2.
330. Id. at 18 (noting that Jewish bridegroom crushes glass under his foot at his
wedding to symbolize grief of destruction of Temple in Jerusalem as well as praying that
there will be dancing in streets of Jerusalem). Even the word Zionism stems from
Mount Zion in Jerusalem. Id. At the end of every Passover seder the words, "Next Year
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for Christians, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. 3 2
In September 1996, Arafat proclaimed thatJerusalem would
be the capital of Palestine. 3  Days after the Hebron Protocol
was signed, Arafat again declared that Jerusalem would be the
capital of Palestine. 334 East Jerusalem is still legally considered
by some to be part of the occupied West Bank and illegally an-
nexed by Israel.3 5 Along those lines, however, Jordan, as the
ousted state, was only a belligerent occupier of the region and
there only to safeguard the area, with no right to reversion.336
Neither Oslo I nor Oslo II allots the PAjurisdiction in Jerusalem,
either over the city, or over the Palestinian residents. 337 The
Camp David Agreements and the peace treaty between Egypt
and Israel do not mention Jerusalem.338
The building of settlements in Jerusalem has been a source
of much contention.3 3 9 As previously mentioned, in September
in Jerusalem" are proclaimed. Id. It must be noted, though, that the Western Wall is
in Eastern Jerusalem, so if there were no free access to Eastern Jerusalem, as was the
case when Jordan was occupying the area from 1948-1967, the Jews would have no ac-
cess to the Wall. Id.; Baron, supra note 326, at 35.
331. See COLLINS & LAPIERR , supra note 2, at 33 (stating that for Muslims, Dome of
the Rock, Quebbet es Sakhra, also in Jerusalem, houses Mount Moriah of antiquity).
The Mount Moriah has a faint impression of the handprint of Gabriel from the night
Prophet Mohammed descended from heaven. Id.
332. See id. at 32 (stating one of most sacred shrines in Christendom, Church of
the Holy Sepulcher, which is built over hill top where Jesus Christ was crucified, is just
few hundred yards away from other two holy sites).
333. See Beres, supra note 197, at 275-76 (noting that Arafat committed violation
when he proclaimed that "Palestine is our land and Jerusalem is our capital."). In the
same speech, Arafat said that they planned to eliminate the State of Israel and praised
the suicide bombers who had murdered women and children, calling them martyrs. Id.
334. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 398 (offering that anyone who did not like that
idea should drink from Dead Sea).
335. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 64 (allowing that 5000 Palestinian residents of
East Jerusalem were permitted to register to vote in the Council elections).
336. See Baron, supra note 327, at 29 (noting that United Nations has left all op-
tions concerning Jerusalem open). Neither the U.N. General Assembly nor the Secur-
ity Council protested when Israel made Western Jerusalem its capital in 1950. Id. at 20.
337. Dajani, supra note 24, at 64. This is one of the items put off until the perma-
nent status negotiations due to the sensitivity of the issue. Oslo I, supra note 20, at
1528.
338. See Baron, supra note 327, at 12, 43 n.73 (noting, however, both President
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin sent letters to President Carter outlining their thoughts
on Jerusalem).
339. See Daoud Kuttab, Bloody Road to Peace Apartheid-Style Obstacles Stalk the Palestini-
ans, PHOENix GAZETrE, Dec. 30, 1996, at B5 ("There is no issue that angers Palestinians
these days more than the issue ofJewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territo-
ries.").
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1996 Israel opened a new entrance to a tunnel that was next to
the Temple Mount.3 4 ° Jordan demanded that the tunnel be
closed, but Israel's conceit to this request would have meant re-
linquishing some sovereignty in Jerusalem. 41
Oslo II does not forbid Israel from building individual
homes or even entire neighborhoods in any of the territories.342
The settlement of Har Homa,343 however, has created much ten-
sion between the parties.3 4 4 The Palestinians claim that the
building of the 6500 apartments at Har Homa violates the Oslo
Accords. 45 Palestinians protested in the Gaza Strip with mem-
bers of the PA and members of Hamas marching arm in arm.3 46
To the Palestinians, the settlements in East Jerusalem are ex-
tremely problematic because this area is the land that they are
hoping will form their state.3 47 The United Nations has called a
conference to discuss the Israeli settlements in the territories,
340. See Tunnel Sparked Clashes in Israel, BALT. SUN, Sept. 30, 1996, at 2A (finding
Temple Mount to be holiest place in Jerusalem). All three major religions hold that
the faithful will gather at the Temple Mount on Judgement day. Id.; see also, Baron,
supra note 327, at 1 (noting tunnel is actually 400-yard water conduit that passes from
Western Wall, under Arab Quarter, and exists on road holy to Christians).
341. Baron, supra note 327, at 3. Jordan argues that Israel needed to consult with
them according to the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Id.
342. Oslo II, supra note 20; see Weiner, supra note 91, at 400 (noting that this
contradicts Arafat's claims that Israelis are violating Oslo Accords through settlement).
343. See Brian Hendler, Peace Now Protesters Arrested at Har Homa, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 2, 1998, at 2 (explaining Har Homa is settlement in Jerusalem where home are
being built for Jews).
344. See Netanyahu: Peace Process in 'Virtual Collapse', supra note 199 (stating that
Arab Nations approved resolution to stop steps toward normal relations with Israel, but
"Netanyahu said he doubts. Arab nations would cut ties to Israel because of continuing
street battles between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians demonstrating against Har
Homa.") There was also resistance by Peace Now, a Jewish Organization, who held a
protest while the government was meeting with the contractor's and potential purchas-
ers in regard to Har Homa. Id. Arafat has responded by appealing to Arab foreign
ministers to stop any steps in regard to "normalizing relations with Israel." Id.; see also
Hendler, supra note 343, at 2 (noting that police barred protestors from entering site
and arrested head of protest).
345. See Hendler, supra note 343, at 2 (saying that Palestinians feel that Har Homa
is part of larger Israeli scheme to separate Palestinian settlements in East Jerusalem
from rest of West Bank).
346. See Netanyahu: Peace Process in 'Virtual Collapse, supra note 199 (quoting Hamas
spokesman stating that "This is a clear message to Israel that the Palestinian people are
united against Israel's policy on settlements and Judaizing Jerusalem.")
347. See Kuttab, supra note 339, at B5 ("Every additional Jewish settler and every
settlement home built will weigh 10 times its physical size in obstructing even a re-
motely fair peace agreement based on concept of two states . . . a Palestinian State
alongside State of Israel").
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including East Jerusalem. s48
A last indication of the internal conflict within East Jerusa-
lem is evidenced by the fact that its Arab population is eligible to
vote for the Council. 49 Palestinian security services operate in
East Jerusalem and Palestinian institutions continue their opera-
tions.3 5 ° The PA, however, is not allowed to set up any type of
office, not even a symbolic one, in East Jerusalem.35'
5. Declaration of a Palestinian State
Arafat pronounced that on May 4, 1999 he will declare Pal-
estine itself independent state.352 Palestine actually declared it-
self an independent state in 1988. 353 Jordan appeared to accept
the Palestinian state, as demonstrated by renouncing its claim to
the West Bank. 5 4 Palestinian leadership has asserted that peace
and security will only come with an independent Palestinian
State.355 Oslo II seems to make the establishment of an in-
348. See U.N. Assembly Approves Talks on Israel Settlements, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Feb.
10, 1999, at Al0 (noting conference itself was voted against by Israel and United States,
but passed by landslide (115-2, with five abstentions); see also Quigley, supra note 264, at
13, 27. (stating that most of international community viewsJewish settlements in territo-
ries as blocking the peace process).
349. See Lustick, supra note 74, at 755 (claiming that before Rabin died, two high
ranking officials were in negotiating idea ofJerusalem as two capitals, that of Israel and
that of Palestine).
350. Id. (opining that Rabin felt he could expand his political base by "emphasiz-
ing Jerusalem as a purely Jewish city").
351. Id. (noting that PA is not allowed to have offices inside city limits of Jerusa-
lem). See Kuttab, supra note 339, at B5 ("such a move attempts to predetermine the
outcome of the negotiations.").
352. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 430 (noting that having gained as much as possi-
ble from Oslo II, Arafat will likely go forward and declare independent Palestinian
State). Arafat has backed off on his statement that he would declare a state on May 5,
1999, and instead suggested that he would negotiate for creation of a state. Id.; see also
Samar Assad, Arafat Moderates Position on Palestinian Statehood, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 20,
1998 (visited Dec. 26, 1998) <http://foxmarketwire.com/news/052098/mideast.sml>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (noting that Netanyahu would con-
sider declaration of State violation and "would react harshly."); Bloody Riots Continue in
Gaza over Militant's Death Sentence Senate Opposes Unilateral Palestinian State as Hamas
Warns Arafat Against an Execution, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 12, 1999, at 9 (stating that U.S.
Senate voted in March 1999, to oppose any unilateral declaration of state by Arafat).
353. See Quigley, supra note 264, at 21 (noting Arafat declared Palestinian state to
include West Bank and Gaza Strip).
354. Id.
355. See Dajani, supra note 24, at 28 (explaining that when Netanyahu took power
he asserted that there would be no independent Palestinian state).
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dependent state inevitable. 56 The outcome, however, must be
one that is within international legal principles, or it will not be
able to endure in the long run. 57
Some scholars believe, though, that a Palestinian state in the
territories would threaten Israel with the presence or absence of
national armed forces.358 Even if the Palestinian State was demil-
itarized, a threat to Israel still would exist because international
enforcement mechanisms may not be adequate to hold Palestine
to its word.359 Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to submit
that the creation of an independent state of Palestine would end
Israel's right to physical survival.36
°
Both sides must agree to compromise in order for the per-
manent status talks to succeed.3 6 1 Arafat wants all of the negotia-
tions regarding matters set forth in the Oslo Accords to be com-
pleted before the beginning of the permanent status negotia-
tions. 362 The climax of the negotiations, however, will occur if
Palestinians are not able to negotiate a permanent settlement
agreement that would meet their minimum standards.3 63
356. See Dallal, supra note 88, at 50 (finding, though, that "the structure and func-
tioning of the envisioned state... needs to be considered realistically and dispassion-
ately."); see also Beres, supra note 197, at 278 (claiming that implementation of Oslo
Accords would definitely lead to Palestinian state, which in turn would incite the Mus-
lims to turn to more Jihad centered attitude, thus making them want to take more of
Israel).
357. See Quigley, supra note 265, at 27 (stating that this will be difficult because
Israel is intent on maintaining settlements).
358. See Louis Rene Beres & Zalman Shoval, Why a Demilitarized Palestinian State
Would Not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under International Law, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 347, 349 (1997) (noting that Arab Nations vying for power in new Palestinian state
would pose just as great threat to Israel).
359. See id. (enforcing their demilitarization would probably be problematic).
360. See Beres, supra note 210, at 330 (believing that this might even lead to nu-
clear war). "Israel-if confronted by a new state of Palestine-would be well advised to
do everything possible to prevent the appearance of Arab or Iranian nuclear powers,
including pertinent non-nuclear preemptions." Id. at 322-23; Inafuku, supra note 75, at
375-76. Ambassador Sabel, an Ambassador Designate of Israel to Canada, and Minister
of Foreign Affairs, has said, however, that an arms race is not in Israel's interest and
"[w]e are abiding by our position that we will not be the first in the Middle East to
introduce nuclear weapons into the area." Inafuku, supra.
361. See Weiner, supra note 91, at 403 (reminding that it is far from unheard of for
leaders in Middle East to be assassinated for compromising with other side).
362. Id. (wanting Israel not to have ability to use Oslo Accords as leveraging power
in permanent status negotiations).
363. Id. at 430 (predicting, erroneously, that on May 5, 1999, Arafat would declare
independent state regardless of circumstance that would likely cost Palestinians their
international backing).
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III. THE FAILURE OF ISRAEL AND THE P.L.O. TO
SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT OSLO I AND OSLO H DOES NOT
BODE WELL FOR THE CHANCES
OF A SUCCESSFUL OSLO III
The impasses that have occurred in the first two stages of
the peace process do not bode well for peace in the Middle East.
The first two Oslo Accords left aside those issues deemed the
most difficult to implement.364 Since the difficult issues were ta-
bled for the permanent status negotiations, Oslo I and Oslo II
were meant to implement other, easier peace-building measures.
Considering the failure of Oslo I and Oslo II to successfully ac-
complish goals such as curtailing propaganda and establishing
land allocation, however, it does not appear that Oslo III will be
successful either.
A. The Problem of Propaganda
As previously discussed, both sides have violated the Oslo
Accords on numerous occasions. One violation, however, over
which both sides have full control is propaganda. 65 Propaganda
invokes deep-seeded emotions that have developed over decades
of war. In order for the people of the Middle East to believe that
their leaders are behind the peace movement, however, the ver-
bal attacks must stop. The peace process, begun in secret due to
fears of how the peoples of both sides would react, has spawned
various reactions. Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli who
wanted to stall the peace process. Hundreds of innocent people
have been harmed by terrorists, many of whom were willing to
sacrifice their own life in the hopes of derailing the peace pro-
cess.3 66 Propaganda fuels these setbacks.
With such high barriers to overcome, it is essential that the
propaganda barrage end. The confidence-building measures
undertaken in Oslo II were considerably undermined by Arafat's
simultaneous call for the destruction of the Israelis. 7 In this
364. See supra notes 259-66 and accompanying text (separating issues into those
that are easier and harder to implement).
365. See supra notes 220-37, 250-51 and accompanying text (explaining propa-
ganda includes speeches by the leaders as well as newspaper reports).
366. See supra notes 238-56 and accompanying text (noting terrorist attacks have
occurred intermittently from period prior to Israel's independence until present day).
367. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text (having impact of widening rift
between people of both parties).
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light, perhaps the fact that the Palestinians exceeded the dead-
line before finally amending their charter to eliminate the call
for the destruction of Jews was the worst violation of all. Indeed,
the message of ihad, which is bolstered through the spread of
propaganda, is still prevalent. Terrorism attacks continue
through today.
B. The Problem of Land
Oslo III is supposed to be the culmination of the peace ne-
gotiations, granting statehood to Palestine in exchange for
peace. The logistics of what land will comprise the new Palestin-
ian state causes much concern. The West Bank and Gaza Strip
are on opposite sides of Israel, necessitating the need for a se-
cure road to run through the middle. 68 This road could give
Israel a large degree of control; if a conflict arose, the road
could be cut off. Palestinians, therefore, must trust Israel
enough to believe that the passage would never be blocked.
The strongest point of contention, however, concerns Jeru-
salem. Arafat has stated that he wants an independent Palestin-
ian state with Jerusalem as the capital. 369 There is no reason to
believe, however, that Israel will relinquish control of any por-
tion ofJerusalem, due to its considerable theological and histori-
cal significance to the Jewish people. The section of Jerusalem
referred to as EastJerusalem contains the Western Wall, the holi-
est Jewish place. Every year at the traditional Passover seder,
Jews pray, "Next year in Jerusalem," signifying the Jewish belief
that they are the chosen people to occupy the land of Israel. To
Muslims, conversely, East Jerusalem, which holds the Dome of
the Rock, is the only the third holiest place behind Mecca and
Medina. Muslims pray facing Mecca, not Jerusalem. With this
disparity in religious significance, chances are great that the two
sides will reach an impasse during the negotiations for East Jeru-
salem. It is unrealistic to expect the parties to agree on the sta-
tus of Jerusalem, when they have not even fulfilled the agree-
ments promised earlier.
As previously stated, these impasses do not bode well for
368. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text (explaining that road was nego-
tiated for in Oslo II).
369. See supra notes 326-52 and accompanying text (explaining that Israeli leaders,
conversely, have said they will never give up any part of Jerusalem).
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peace in the Middle East. If the parties cannot agree on imple-
menting initial peace-building measures, then there is little hope
that those deemed more complex will come to fruition. Viola-
tions of the accords, especially those that curtail confidence-
building measures such as propaganda, must stop immediately
in order to move forward towards Oslo III.
CONCLUSION
The problems previously discussed, aside from those con-
cerning an independent Palestinian state, were negotiated in
Oslo I and Oslo II. The authors of the Oslo Accords created a
step-by-step process to introduce peace to the Middle East. How-
ever, in many instances it seems as though leaders from both
sides worked against the Oslo Accords. The stalled peace pro-
cess needs to resume by creating Oslo III, without waiting for the
outstanding issues of earlier Oslo Accords to be implemented.
Oslo III should set forth those issues that Oslo II failed to imple-
ment, and incorporate them into the permanent status negotia-
tions. These issues, however, should not be subject to negotia-
tion, but simply on the timeline of objectives to satisfy. The
sooner Oslo III is signed, the closer we will come to peace in the
Middle East.
